Roshwald's Philosophy of Care – the Creative Nature of the Concern (Implications for Sustainable Development)

Roshwaldowska filozofia troski – twórczy charakter troski (implikacje dla zrównoważonego rozwoju)

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Abstract

The article considers issues connected with Professor Mordecai Roshwald's philosophical and anthropological thought. It presents important elements of the philosophy of care, focusing on its fundamental concepts such as: appeal, dignity, being-with-you, and being-with-we. It is postulated that these elements may be employed to serve the idea of sustainable development. This has been done on the example of the so-called participation:
a. social participation,
b. mechanisms for citizen participation.

Key words: Mordecai Roshwald, philosophy of care, appeal, dignity, being-with-you, being-with-we, participation, social participation, mechanisms for citizen participation

Streszczenie

W proponowanym artykule podjęto zagadnienie związane z problematyką filozoficzno-antropologiczną profesora Mordeciaia Roshwalda. Przedstawiono nośne elementy filozofii troski wskazując na jej podstawowe zagadnienia jak: apel, godność, bycie-z-ty, czy bycie-z-my. Jednocześnie postuluje się, że omówione elementy mogą w swej strukturze posłużyć idei zrównoważonego rozwoju, dokonano tego na przykładzie tzw. partycypacji:
a. partycypacji społecznej,
b. mechanizmów partycypacji obywatelskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: Mordecai Roshwald, filozofia troski, apel, godność, bycie-z-ty, bycie-z-my, partycypacja, partycypacja społeczna, mechanizmy partycypacji obywatelskiej

Introduction

Philosophical reflection on reality is based on experiencing it through the senses and intellect. The history of human thought is full of different conceptions that tried to answer the questions about our existence and the world of animate and inanimate nature. All these attempts gave rise to human science, which is so extensive that it is necessary to place a given scientific discipline in some particular branch.

Like other fields of knowledge, philosophy explores reality within some range. Although *love of wisdom* is interdisciplinary, philosophy is classified as part of the humanities. By its very nature, however, it is a meta-discipline.

Philosophy can be divided into different branches, such as: philosophy of knowledge, philosophy of reality, philosophy of human being, philosophy of values, history of philosophy, philosophy of culture, philosophy of God, philosophy of religion, or philosophy of animate and inanimate nature. Of course, it is impossible to list them all here, and it is not our goal. We just want to indicate that the scope of each particular branch has been set out in detail.

The article aims to present the philosophy of care, addressing the issues related to the creative nature

and meaning of concern. This will allow us to show the implications of philosophy of care for sustainable development.

1. The creative nature of care

1. 1. Appeal

The term *appeal* is ambiguous. It comes from the French word *appel,* which means a call, a request to change a decision. Its meaning has evolved and the word is used to refer to a direct appeal, demand, or an address to the community made by the authorities. In existential phenomenology, following Luijpen, an appeal is to be understood as an active goodwill that leads to the affirmation of interpersonal relationships (Luijpen, 1972).

The appeal in Professor Roshwald's philosophy has an ethical and moral dimension, but it is not based solely on the stringent norm that the human being must comply with. The appeal, as described in his works, is associated with the fundamental references *I – other*. These references derive directly from the constitutive interpersonal relationship described as the affirmation of *other* by *I*.

The relationship *I – other, I – society* does not refer to treating reality like an object, distancing oneself from it, and what follows being isolated from it, which allows the *I* to minimize its involvement in social life. Withdrawal from social life entails adopting individualism as a negation of the *other* in society: *Individualism is not a virtue in society, and in the public life, as in a broader perspective it destroys all initiatives of <other> in the social development. Individualism is inherently quite egotistical* (Roshwald, 2006).

The egotistical attitude of the expansive self-centered and autocratic ego which is focused on its own needs along with the acceptance of the democratic system, results in totalitarian rule, in which the individual striving for power creates imaginary relationships in order to achieve his own benefit. Therefore, a selfish man treats appeal as a form of relationship that can help him come into power.

In this context, the work of Professor Roshwald seems to provide a thoughtful insight into the reality in which man realizes his goals and needs. An expansive appeal – order also assumes that the *other* is an inanimate object, it does not speak, does not feel, and it only has to carry out what it is told to do: *Humanity in every generation is always between the known and the unknown past, but with hope for the future. Wondering which way to go: to rely on the experience and wisdom, or take a chance (...). As we have seen, choosing one of these alternatives is not simple. The human condition and human effort known as civilization, requires careful symbiosis of past and future. Such a relationship to be crowned with success cannot be based on the order of one general performance model adopted for the benefit of only the individual and his ego (...), <I> must find*

the right way in various spheres of life and civilization, according to the nature of each sphere. What may be the law in science may be wrong in ethics. What may be beneficial to the national policy may be wrong for the international community. We cannot forget this (Roshwald, 2006).

The affirmation of *I – other* is the central place of the appeal. The *I* becomes *I* when it respects the *other* and when it does not cross the limits of the *other's* freedom. The o*ther* forces *I* to step out of its own selfishness and take into consideration the needs of *other*.

Mordecai Roshwald regarded the juxtaposition *I - he* in terms of moral evil, seeing in it depersonalization of the *other*. He anxiously observed a shift towards utilitarianism in contemporary life, shift which constitutes a threat to human life and results in loss of the spiritual life as we depart from the norms, or simply abandon ethical and moral values.

In this spirit of Socratic admonition, Roshwald warned against losing ourselves in a world of personal moral principles: *Amazingly, these basic, clear and appropriate rules of conduct can be found in the letters prior to our times, (...) namely in the Bible. It is the past, distant past, which should be taken over by the present and future generations (...). The future, therefore, could voluntarily adopt the guidelines of the past, because the basic principles of morality can be found scattered in several books of the Bible* (Roshwald, 2006).

It is sufficient to point out some of these universal principles. The Decalogue can be a very good case in point. While the first two commandments are mainly religious and theological in nature, the remaining ones can be seen as the fundamental moral document outlining how we should behave. The prohibition of killing, stealing and adultery expresses an ethical imperative. *There is also an order not to lie under oath and do not bear false witness against thy neighbor. (...) Do not covet the property of another person – which means do not try to steal things <of other>, the order which ensures harmonious cohabitation. In short, if the commandments are respected by all members of society, there will be no crime, nor hostility, nor discord nor predatory economic race. The recipe for proper human relations can be found in the Bible, commandments are proof of it (...). In a sense it can be said that the affirmation of man can pull into a simple imperative <love your neighbor as yourself> a well-known principle that Jesus quoted by accepting the past as a principle in the future* (Roshwald 2006).

1. 2. Dignity

As a rule, the issue of dignity is connected with that of freedom, justice, and man's responsibility. Today, dignity is viewed through the prism of equality and tolerance, and entails acceptance of the truth criteria (Howard, 1992).

In personalistic philosophy, *the dignity of man is the internal, inborn and natural human right, independent of the social context and history. Society and history do not give it to man, but they have the obligation to respect and protect it* (Gałkowski, 1994). Dignity applies in the same way to men, women, and children, the healthy and the disabled. All human beings having the same nature and the same origin, enjoy equal dignity (CCC, 1994).

Mordecai Roshwald does not speak directly of the dignity of man, but it can be argued that all his work is an attempt to show it. Furthermore, it should be noted that in Roshwald' s philosophy, dignity becomes visible in the relationship *I - other*. The relation *I - he* is clearly a dangerous one as *other* can be subjected to law, religion, economy, and so deprived of liberty and justice, all this happening in the apparent social order, in the democratic system and with universal consent. In this way, the human being loses his dignity and humanity, while at the same time remaining seemingly responsible for the *other*.

The relationship between *I* and *other* implies not only responsibility, which is a measure and test of humanity, but it also manifests human dignity, as it is relations with the whole ethical and moral context that show and explain who man really is as a person. According to Professor Roshwald, dignity is undoubtedly related to ethical values expressed in the relationship *I – other*. Original as this approach is, it basically refers to Buber's view of man: *The monological existence is not that of the one you can call a lonely man, but of the one who is not able to realize the community where he lives in with the judgments of fate. (…) The dialogical existence, even in the extreme abandonment, is characterized by painful, but reinforcing feeling of reciprocity.*

The monological existence does not go beyond the boundaries of one's own self even in the most responsive community. Dialogic should not be confused with love. *But love without dialogic, without real outgoing to the other, reaching to the other and companying with the other, the love remaining with itself - this love is called Lucifer. Of course, to be able to reach to the other, you must have a starting point, you have to find yourself at yourself and be with yourself. The dialogue between mere individuals is a sketch, which can be filled in only by the dialogue between persons* (Buber, 1992).

Roshwald's approach differs from Buber's in his deistic view of God and acceptance of the biblical revelation along with the ethical and moral message that it carries. That is why Roshwald clearly emphasizes the fundamental importance and primordiality of responsibility for the *other* as the key element of human morality.

He explains a close connection between dignity and responsibility taking into consideration human life and daily life of every individual. He stresses the inseparable link between *I* and *other*, link without which dignity becomes an abstract and useless qui-

etism, and responsibility is reduced to obeying the law.

In the model that we defined as the philosophy of care, dignity finds its full explanation only in the relation *I – other*. Changing the focus from the *other* to *he* can lead to disappointment, because without that fundamental orientation toward the *other,* the dignity of *other* is rejected in favor of the utilitarian positive law. Moreover, the *I* also does not see dignity in itself, and is not ready to serve people to choose the good and the truth in realizing the social ethos.

Taking into account unquestionable difficulties posed by the *I* perceiving the *other* as *he* and not limiting its own ego which lacking this important relationship with the *other* is not able to devote itself to the community, Professor Roshwald emphasizes that human life must be based on integrity and responsibility. Therefore, we suggest that dignity should be understood as concern for the other, the self and the world (Roshwald, 2006).

The analysis of Roshwald's philosophical thought which is characterized by strong defense of the fundamental importance of cognition and relations arising from metaphysical realism convinces us to advance the above thesis. Although dignity in Roshwald's view is not connected with man's nature, but instead with the relationship *I – other*, it still entails a moderate cognitive realism through the true responsibility, understood as the credibility of actions that should be based on morality, while adopting the metaphysical realism.

This situation implies that man building his relations cannot rely only on an imaginary reality, but must take into account the reality as it is, regardless of the cognitive problems. To discover the *other*, the *I* must become aware that it is looking for itself and realizing itself in specific situations and in society. As a result, the *I* can see its own dignity and the dignity of the *other*.

2. Meaning of concern

2. 1. Being-with-you

Let us define the term *concern* in the philosophy of care as being-with-you and being-with-we. Ancient philosophy emphasized harmony of the world considering animate and inanimate beings, in the Middle Ages human reality was described in relation to the creative act of God *ex nihil*, and the finite world of human existence was juxtaposed to the existence of the infinite being. In the modern era, on the other hand, man has been subordinated to empiricism.

Mordecai Roshwald's philosophical reflection on the human world makes us define his approach as the philosophy of care which emphasizes the creative power of *being-with*. As a rule, the term *being-with* is used to describe an interpersonal relationship, though it is not clear because it consists of:

1. Being,
2. With.

The very notion of being is ambiguous. In terms of the *analytic of dasein*, being is a way of perceiving existence (Pomian, 1965; Michalski, 1978). In his description of *(...) man, Heidegger adopts a specific perspective. He is no longer concerned with the description of existential experiences in their course and in their internal <quality> content. He assumes that every experience is primarily a way of human existence. It lives in man, and man lives in it. Man is not directed to the world through his acts but above all and in the first place, by ways of his own existence. It is important to perceive man from the perspective of <ways of existence> especially those that are necessary for him* (Kruczalak, 2011). On the other hand, *mit* indicates the ambiguity of coexistence, which always manifests itself in being *mitsein.* Although Roshwald was not concerned with the *analytic of Dasein*, the study of his writings raises a number of questions, such as: Is it valid to claim that the creative nature of the human being in Roshwald's philosophy reveals itself in *being-with*, as it was the case in Heidegger and Abbagnano? or How to understand the concept of *being-with*?

We believe that *being-with* takes on a new dimension in Roshwald's philosophy. It is not about exploring *being* only, but it involves looking at human existence in the context of responsibility arising out of concern for the *other*. According to Professor, concern is not conditioned by fear and anxiety about nothingness, as it was the case in Heidegger's philosophy, but it is the natural disposition of every man who coexisting with *others* and the world, recognizes the common desire to improve the life of every human being, which at the same time makes it possible to seek the truth.

Concern presupposes openness towards the *other* and towards the world. It does not consist in looking at the reality in the context of subjective recognition of it, but in the responsible pursuit of the common good through careful admonition, actions and decisions that will bring individuals and whole societies together (Roshwald, 1959).

Thus, the *being-with* in Roshwald's thought is not only connected with responsibility, appeal, or dignity, but also with the desire for truth. In this way, the *being-with* shows new forms of coexistence to a modern man. One of these forms is global communication. *What was far away in the ancient times, in the Middle Ages and in the early modern period is close today. Today no one can say that people living hundreds of miles away from each other cannot communicate. The global communication allows man to discover the cultural, social, national diversity; on the other hand, one can discern his existence thanks to these differences* (Bartoszewski, 2012).

Communication entails processing of information, but it is not the same as dialogue. In communication, some message is transmitted, either in a straightforward way or it may be manipulated in order to achieve the desired effect, e.g. advertising – growth in sales, political parties – increasing support.

Dialogue, on the other hand, assumes opening ourselves onto the ethos of the human person and whole societies; moreover, dialogue makes it possible to seek the truth in an objective way. In dialogue we look for the *other* and build the relations *with-you* and *we,* at the same time.

Man discerns differences between himself and *you*. Before he freely and consciously chooses *you*, he realizes that the co-existence is connected with his *being-with*. *Being-with-you* becomes a driving force for changing the world, and consequently improving the reality. However, man may become subordinated to what seems to be better, for example: to a virtual world.

Nowadays, it is not a virtual reality which is at the service of man. On the contrary, it is man who is at the service of new technology, as exemplified by different addictions, which have become a disease of affluence. As a result, different centers that provide treatment to help people return to life in the macro- and micro-society are being opened. So what civilization brings and what is sometimes believed to be a qualitative leap, disrupts relationships and responsibility in favor of half-truths, which make us believe that everything is good: *we cannot accept everything as the truth, civilization without the truth is a civilization of half-truths, our duty is to exhort, to look for and take care of the good, but only in the truth* (Bartoszewski, 2012).

There is no doubt that this leads the human being to explore his own opportunities. But if man closes himself only in the world of half-truths, this may lead him to denying the *other,* its life, views, and beliefs. Man connects to *you* and *we* with multiple bonds, they enter into a relationship. He also opens up to the world and responds to it in a conscious way by his actions. That is why, development and opportunities for further human progress are constantly within certain limits (Bartoszewski, 2012).

2. 2. Being-with-we

Man sees his own *self* through his desires, wants, or actions. However, the *I* viewed in such a way does not define the whole man. Man is not *reflected* adequately in the consciousness or in experiencing. Firstly, this is because our body, which also defines us, is not seen. Secondly, our emotionality is ignored, too (Bartoszewski, 2012; Möller, 1969; Panennberg, 1978).

This approach also completely ignores experiencing the *other* as something that influences the *I*: *Mankind discovered or created, the realm of consciousness that existing outside dimension of time (...), where neither in the past nor in the future does not dominate realm of reality, which wants the truth at all*

times and outside the tangible world (Roshwald, 2006). As a result, the *I* treats *we* as a place where it can meet its needs, not referring to the truth.

We believe that this kind of thinking has influenced the social life. It overlooks the importance of community, through which the *I* can discover the creative character of itself. At this point it is worth noting that already German idealists emphasized the creative nature of *we* and considered the *I* in the context of God's existence. Undoubtedly, this approach helped to overcome the isolationism of philosophy of reason, but on the other hand, according to philosophers, it undermined the importance of human existence (Bartoszewski, 2012).

Philosophy of existence considered existence as something primary, something that preceded the essence of human being and consequently, it rejected the transcendental dimension.

In Professor Roshwald's philosophical reflection on the reality, we can see a *phenomenon* when man can suddenly or gradually separate from the *we* closing himself in his own *self*. The result is that the *I* tolerates *we* only as long as *we* is needed to carry out some undertaking. However, the *we* is more than just the *other*. Every man in his existence is directed at *we*. Thanks to this, the *I* can find itself in *we* as a being existing in a community. Hence, the *other* is what the *I* is missing. It is in the *other* that man can discover and evaluate his ethical and moral attitudes. It is noteworthy that when Heidegger and Sartre, for example, wrote about *other*, they meant *the other*. Martin Buber could not imagine a human being without *you*. Abbagnano indicated that the *I* realized itself only in the triple movement of transcendence, i.e. through the *I*, *other* and *world*. In Professor Roshwald's writings, we can see the relation of the *I* to *other* and *we*. It is manifested in the conscious pursuit of the truth, truth that can be reached through appeal, dialogue, and relationship, despite a broad consensus that is used in the system of liberal democracy.

Although the liberalism of modern democracy being based on pluralism emphasizes individualism, it ignores *sine qua non*, i.e. the real reality that is experienced through senses and the mind. Without these two elements and realness, we are dealing with the Cartesian world that is born in the human consciousness.

This allows man to accept or reject the *other* in favor of various ideologies, whether political, economic, or religious. Human history is full of disappointments with man's behavior, but all these disappointments cannot disrupt the search for answers to the question of what man is. They also cannot destroy the reference of *I* to *other* and *we*; nor can they make ethical and moral standards illusory. Man sees the

differences between the *other* and *you*. Before he freely and consciously chooses *you*, he realizes that coexistence is connected with *being-with*.

3. Participation

3. 1. Social Participation

Social problems come down to meeting not only the basic needs of homo sapiens, but also to protecting the resources which highly developed societies take by the handful. The concept of sustainable development strongly emphasizes the principle of participation, i.e. socialization (Krajewska, 2009). This principle assumes that citizens should be involved in planning and decision-making for sustainable development. The sense of responsibility for future generations encourages the public to take decisions which aim to improve the planning process for the benefit of next generations. From the perspective of sustainable development and on the basis of the concept of socialization, it is necessary to shape the society in such a way that it would take responsibility for itself, others and the world, respecting the interests, needs and values of various social stakeholders.

Following this idea, we can look at Roshwald's thought, which indicates that participation cannot be based only on the social contract, but it must be carried out in the context of concern, which in fact entails socialization: *The attitude to <other – who is different> depends greatly on how we treat <other – different> who lives and fulfills himself in a particular social, economic and religious group. Man developing in a sustainable way is present in all references, no matter how he realizes his individual and social tasks. If a person decides to choose egotistical references, he pursues an appeal to the <other> as a command or prohibition, highlighting the formalism of social life: It is clear that each person is not the best judge of his own interests, and should therefore rely on the judgment of others by developing in a sustainable way. (...) Respect for others is a consequence of the realization that he is not alone in the world, and as <I> my rights are the same for <other> who has the authority to make decisions and choose and find solutions that do not only lead to a better life, but the affirmation of man* (Roshwald, 2006).

Roshwald's philosophy of care[1] indicates that participation does not depend on the recognition that the values and interests of all community members have their legitimacy in exercising control over the public authorities' decisions and that they should be expressed in a consensus. The key element of planning is not a consensus seen as decision-making in a *social contract*, but in the truth which is understood as *veritas rei et intellectus adaequatio est*, and which is a *sine qua non* for the common good.

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[1] Concern entails taking responsibility for oneself, the world and future generations. According to Roshwald, complete socialization takes place when the human being

accepts concern as a starting point for participatory actions.

Participation forms the basis of civil society. The real socialization is not possible if the relation *I – other* is rejected. If this happens, the *I* carries out its activities treating *other* as part of the world of existing things. Moreover, the *I* expands its ownership (in the realm of having, and not being with *other*), its dominance and power. Dehumanization leads to weakening of the relations in social life, with man becoming an instrument subordinated to the state structure, deprived of his rights, freedom and the truth.

Roshwald's insight into the reality of *being-with-you* and *being-with-we* brought to light not only existence, but also the relation and responsibility and pointed out to the fact that through care we discover the community of the good which is based on dialogue and the truth.

Without the creative nature of concern, expressed in the word and in the truth, it would not be possible to *create* a community which focuses on the concern for the human family, a community where opinions are shared to create the right standards in order to protect children, mothers, and fathers. The aim of this activity is, therefore, the good of the individual and the community.

It should be noted that this approach does not assume the egotistical participation of legalism, but it refers to the appeal for care. This care is manifested in the affirmation of man who becomes a place of social and ethical balance. At the same time, appeal and care constitute the basis of personal growth. Although the objective of sustainable development can be achieved through consistent joint action of all stakeholders, the principle of participation can be included in the concept of extended social responsibility in the context of Mordecai Roshwald's proposals and his philosophical thought, which is based on moderate metaphysical and epistemological realism.

3. 2. Mechanisms for citizen participation

Mechanisms for citizen participation to realize sustainable development are based on two premises. The first one concerns enriching and supplementing traditional democratic mechanisms, while the other one refers to participation of citizens, i.e. managing the public sphere in such a way that the differences in understanding of the common good are not resolved by administrative decisions or by the law of the market. This approach assumes:

    a communication,
    b consultation,
    c co-decision.

Mechanisms for citizen participation assume a consensual approach to issues and social problems.

According to Roshwald, democracy is based on the value of equality, and it allows for different behaviors and beliefs, including different ideas on how the state, human resources or natural resources are to be managed. It is also noteworthy that Roshwald criticizes the understanding of the truth in the context of

a common consent and he states, among other things, that a person is losing a sense of what is good, true and beautiful, he no longer knows what is right and what is is not right, is losing his understanding and is indulging in power: *the agreement between people in a democratic system leads to one goal, to achieve power. They claim that they aspire to power to create laws that will be impartial and fair for all citizens to secure freedom and justice. All this is done through marketing activities aimed at the formulation of rights corresponding to the appropriate group of voters. So, in fact, truth is connected with the political activity of future government. Of course individual people are in government as ministers of truth, however apparently, masters are politicians and their staff, state government is doing what the majority introduced in everyday life* (Roshwald, 2006). Professor Roshwald describes a type of man for whom democracy opens up a wealth of different options, but who lacks ethical and moral signposts. So, he does not know exactly what to choose, what is true and what is false (Roshwald, 1963, 2003). All this makes it impossible to determine the truth taking into account the epistemological and metaphysical realism; for realism, according to the proponents of a common consent, constraints pluralism with its principles which must be referred to when defining, for example, what man is. Moreover, in pluralism decisions are made by the majority in the so-called free choice. What, then, is to be regarded as the moral norm? What, then, is to be regarded as the truth, the good or justice? Keeping in mind philosophy of care, it must be clearly emphasized that the mechanisms for social participation for sustainable development can be based on appeal, dignity, being-with-we and being-with-you, i.e.:

A. The affirmation of the *I – other* is the central place of appeal, where immediacy and spontaneity, order and presence show the relationship of personal growth. Humanity and the dignity of man is only embodied in and realized through respect for the *other;* for truth and freedom being so different from falsity and arbitrariness make the individual care for himself, others and the world.

B. Concern, in our view, is revealed in the affirmation of and trust in every existing being, which in turn tests man's trustworthiness to himself making him worthy of himself – or *vice versa* – not worthy of himself or in other words, someone who betrays and abandons the relationship with the other, himself, and the world, i.e. shirks the responsibility. Only the man who will meet with himself by building self-responsibility can enter into credible relationships with other people, and finally with the world.

C. *Being-with-you* entails links similar to those that we see in *being-with-we*. They manifest themselves in the formation of human reality,

for example through discoveries in medicine, technology, physics, etc.

D. *Being-with-we* is rooted in ethics. This does not mean that man is condemned to it. In order to be, the *I* has to orient its actions towards the *other* because man is a responsible being. Acceptance of conscious responsibility leads to a genuine concern for the community. The *other* is accepted by the attitude of being ready to suffer and act for the good of the other person, as well as by putting the other person above the *I*.

Conclusion

To summarize, Mordecai Roshwald's philosophical thought can be used for the idea of sustainable development in some respects:

1) if we take into account not only the anthrophological aspect, but mainly the social one and consider it in the context of moderate cognitive and metaphysical realism (the principle of social participation is manifested here).

2) Roshwald's concept entails full responsibility for the other, oneself and the world, but in the context of classical understanding of the truth (we are striving to return once again to the true reality with all its shortcomings and questions).

3) it becomes necessary to look at man through the prism of his relations towards himself, the other and the world (according to Roshwald, only in this way it is possible to care about the present and future reality in a sustainable way).

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