

Examining the Relationship between Globalization and Sustainable Migration in OECD Countries

Badanie związku między globalizacją a zrównoważonością migracji w krajach OECD

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Abstract

This study examines the relationship between migrant stock and economic-political-social globalization index values. The study uses annual data from the United Nations Migration Report, International Migration Statistics, International Migration Report and KOF globalization index for 27 OECD countries for the period 2012-2022. In the study, the sustainable migration relationship and globalization data in OECD countries are analyzed with the panel ARDL method. According to the results of the analysis, a 1% increase in economic globalization in the long run increases the migration burden of countries by 0.60%. Similarly, a 1% increase in political globalization increases the migration burden of countries by 0.06%. A 1% increase in social globalization decreases the migration burden of countries by 0.48%. The findings show that reducing social differences between countries has a decreasing effect on the migration burden of countries. However, as economic and political globalization increases, the migration burden also increases. In an economically and politically globalized world, focusing on increasing social equity and justice to manage the migration burden will contribute to the creation of more balanced and sustainable migration policies.

Key words: migration, globalization, sustainable migration, international migration flows

Streszczenie

W niniejszym artykule analizuje się związek między liczbą migrantów a wartościami indeksu globalizacji ekonomiczno-polityczno-społecznej. W badaniu wykorzystano roczne dane z Raportu Narodów Zjednoczonych o Migracji, Międzynarodowych Statystyk Migracyjnych, Raportu o Migracji Międzynarodowej i indeksu globalizacji KOF dla 27 krajów OECD za okres 2012-2022. W badaniu zrównoważona relacja migracyjna i dane dotyczące globalizacji w krajach OECD są analizowane za pomocą metody panelowej ARDL. Zgodnie z wynikami analizy, 1% wzrost globalizacji gospodarczej w dłuższej perspektywie zwiększa obciążenie migracyjne krajów o 0,60%. Podobnie, 1% wzrost globalizacji politycznej zwiększa obciążenie migracyjne krajów o 0,06%. 1% wzrost globalizacji społecznej zmniejsza obciążenie migracyjne krajów o 0,48%. Wyniki pokazują, że zmniejszenie różnic społecznych między krajami ma zmniejszający wpływ na obciążenie migracyjne krajów. Jednak wraz ze wzrostem globalizacji gospodarczej i politycznej zwiększa się również obciążenie migracyjne. W świecie zglobalizowanym pod względem ekonomicznym i politycznym skupienie się na zwiększeniu sprawiedliwości społecznej i równości w zarządzaniu ciężarem migracji przyczyni się do stworzenia bardziej zrównoważonej i trwałej polityki migracyjnej.

Słowa kluczowe: migracja, globalizacja, zrównoważona migracja, międzynarodowe fale migracyjne

1. Introduction

By examining the relationship between economic, political and social globalization and the stock of immigrants in OECD countries, this study analyzes the effects of *global networks* on the act of migration. This issue is extremely important because many developments such as the settlement of humanity, population growth, from the increase in agricultural activities to the emergence of states, from geographical discoveries to the development of trade, from industrialization and modernization efforts to mechanization, from the industrial society to the information society and the rapid growth in mass media are defined as globalization processes. But true globalization begins with the industrial revolution. In this process, access to information and access to goods and services became easier. Consumption, tastes, opinions and thoughts among people are shared on a global scale. Rapprochement and cooperation between cultures and societies increased. Core values such as the free movement of capital and labor, democracy, and human rights became even more important, and local identities were strengthened (Giddens, 1991; Nar, 2021a).

Moreover, in the understanding of the *borderless world* that has been shaped by the globalization process, cross-border human flows and the permeability of borders became an important problem (Ohmae, 1999). Today, in addition to the wave of immigrants/refugees/irregular migrants coming from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, especially for security and economic reasons, the war in Ukraine increased migration pressure in Anatolia and Europe. This situation transforms concepts such as migration, human mobility, and sustainable migration into a global phenomenon with economic, political and social consequences. Immigration policies are supported by establishing parallels between cheap labor/skilled labor and economic development in the receiving countries, while unskilled and problematic immigrants continue to be excluded by seeing them as the main cause of political, economic and social problems (Çeştepe, 2012; Nar, 2021a; Pijnenburg and Rijken, 2021; Tahiroğlu, 2022).

There is a limited number of empirical studies revealing the relationship between globalization and migration in the literature. This is a significant shortcoming. Discussions in the field mostly focus on economic globalization and migration. This study is valuable in terms of drawing attention to the importance of the reducing effect of social globalization on migration pressure. In addition, although it is stated in the KOF social globalization index that *international individual transfers* increase social globalization by providing personal interaction, it is an important deficiency that it does not adequately address whether *international social transfers* provided by developed countries have a similar effect. The panel autoregressive distributed delay (ARDL) methodology, which is an advanced and complex econometric method, is used in order to better understand the subject of the study. First of all, cross-sectional dependency tests are performed for all countries that make up the panel, and then the second generation unit root tests are started. Due to the fact that the variables are stationary at different levels, the panel ARDL method is the most effective method for the analysis of the cointegration relationship. According to the results of the analysis, the increase in economic and political globalization increases the migration burden of countries in the long run, while the increase in social globalization decreases the migration burden of countries. In addition, a limitation of the study is that migration data for ten OECD countries, namely Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Portugal, are partially or completely unavailable.

2. Theoretical background and conceptual framework

Throughout history, people have left their physical and social environment for various reasons such as economic inequality, political instability, security problems, war and conflict, increasing population, climate change, natural disasters, and human rights violations. Some migrations occur depending on the will of the person, while others were made by the force of circumstances against the will of the person. In the terminological sense, the concept of migration is the settling of people in another space by leaving the physical and social environment to which they are attached (Castles and Miller, 2008; UN, 2023; Kofman et al, 2000). In general terms, migrations are divided in two as cross-border (international) migration and intra-border (internal) migration. If human mobility crosses international borders, it is called cross-border migration, and if it remains within national or local borders, it is called intra-border migration. In addition, the concept of migration can be classified under four headings as (i) short-term and daily, (ii) regular, (iii) irregular, and (iv) settled migration. Daily labor movements across the borders of neighboring countries, shopping, tourism and health trips can be considered short-term migration. Migrations made for educational, economic, social, religious, etc. reasons can be given as examples of regular and irregular migrations. Resident migration, on the other hand, is the granting of citizenship rights to citizens of other countries in order for countries to meet population or skilled labor shortages by adopting developed and multicultural policies. The distinction between legal and illegal immigration describes the legal or illegal entry of people into the destination country (Nar, 2021a; World Economic Forum, 2017). The word refugee, which is perceived as a similar concept, defines people who have legal status according to international agreements and who were forced to leave their country because of their race, religion, ethnicity, membership of a particular social group, political opinions or for reasons such as war or natural disasters. Asylum-seekers refers to those who are trying to

gain refugee status. Migrants refer to those who voluntarily settle in another country for economic reasons (ILO, 2021a; UN, 2023; Toit, 1990).

The change and transformation experienced in recent years with the globalization process has deeply affected the phenomenon of migration. Especially the development of information, transportation and communication tools facilitated human mobility and this is seen as a natural consequence of the globalization process (UN, 2023). Globalization can be explained as the increasing economic, socio-cultural and political cooperation of societies. Economic globalization refers to trade, exports and imports, cross-border flows of labor and capital, trade flows between countries and free trade practices. Political globalization is the ability and cooperation of countries to participate in international political activities. Indicators include membership in international organizations, the number of international treaties, the influence of a country on global politics, the presence and expansion of international NGOs in the country, etc. Social globalization is the availability and use of communication tools that enable interaction between people and societies (mobile phones, television, broadband internet facilities). It is the movement of people across borders, the use of passports, the number of international airports, information sharing between countries, freedom of the press and digital media, the number of foreign nationals living in a country, and the level of openness to foreign cultural influences. The role of women in society, the level of education in a country, freedom of belief, organizational rights, the rule of law, the degree of acceptance of cultural goods (Mc Donalds, Coca-Cola, IKEA, etc.), participation in art-music-sports events, and *international money transfers* enable personal/social interaction (Gygli et al, 2019; Nar, 2021b). The rapid globalization of labor, information and communication has liberated people's mobility like never before. Many people with different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds have migrated long distances to different parts of the world (Colic-Peisker, 2017).

The migration process has become a global phenomenon with the globalization of labor after World War I. Economic reasons, security, geographical conditions and developed countries' demand for cheap labor accelerated this process. Millions of Europeans crossed the Atlantic to North America, while those living in Western Europe migrated to Australia and Argentina, where land was plentiful and the climate was mild. Similar population movements took place in Southeast Asia, Africa, China and the tropics (Gilpin, 2001; Giovanni et al, 2015). By the 2000s, globalization and technological advances increased the volume, diversity, geographical scope and overall complexity of international migration (Czaika and de-Haas, 2014).

However, in recent years, international migration is seen as the main cause of social and economic problems for destination and transit countries. Developed countries, in particular, argue that migrants experience social cohesion problems and have destabilizing effects on domestic stability, and the concept of migrant is identified with skilled labor. Increased trade liberalization and capitalization through the globalization process offer higher opportunities for skilled labor, while unskilled labor faces extremely low wage levels and limited opportunities. The governments of Germany, France and Austria, for example, encourage skilled labor and brain drain while tightening control policies to reduce unskilled foreign labor and prevent irregular migration. For example, non-EU nationals are required to obtain a *work authorization certificate* to prove that they are skilled individuals in order to work within the EU (de-Haas et al, 2019; Enderwick, 2006; Kaur, 2010).

Global migration movements do not only have economic reasons such as labor and employment, but also political and physical reasons such as war, asylum, and climatic conditions. These reasons enhance cultural interaction and communication as well as kinship and friendship relations between migrants and local people (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Triandafyllidou, 2018).

Therefore, while globalization causes international migration with its *economic – socio-cultural – political* aspects (Dokos, 2017), international migration reproduces the globalization process through economic contributions, labor force, social and cultural diversity, and population movements (Koser, 2018). In this context, three effects of the globalization process on the act of migration are evident: (i) travel and communication between people has become easier than in the past due to lower transportation and communication costs, (ii) the globalization process has eased restrictive government policies about cross-border human mobility (e.g. the ability to send money between countries, visa facilitation, entry bans, etc.), and (iii) access to information has become easier through satellite systems, TV, mobile phones and the internet, and ideas, ideologies and information are shared between people due to increased education and literacy rates (Czaika and de-Haas, 2014; Pawłowski, 2013).

The desire to migrate among geographically distant and culturally diverse people is increasing day by day. For example, while there was labor migration from Turkey to many Western European countries, especially Germany, between 1960 and 1980, today this situation has partially reversed. Since the 2000s, Turkey has continued to receive immigrants from Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, legally or illegally, for various reasons such as internal conflicts, political instability, security, economic and social inequality (Adıgüzel, 2021; Alakuş and Uzan, 2020; İçduygu and Keyman, 2000). According to 2021 official data, the immigrant stock in Turkey comprises 6.1 million people, of which more than five million are Syrians and approximately one million are immigrants from Afghanistan and the African continent (GIB, 2021). When the number of immigrants entering the country illegally is added to this number, the immigrant stock is understood not to be sustainable. This situation proves that global flows such as immigrants/refugees/asylum seekers are very important and a social problem too important to be left to the political interests and initiative of political decision makers.


3. The concept of sustainable migration and globalization

With the acceleration of the globalization process, the concept of migration has turned into the concept of sustainable migration. The UN Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994, addressed the concept of sustainable global migration for the first time and evaluated the effects of migration on source and destination countries. The conference questioned how sustainable policies should be arranged between migrants and local people for the benefit of both parties. As a result of these efforts, the *Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)* was established in 2006, where UN, migration and sustainable development issues were analyzed in depth. GFMD held its first meeting in Brussels in 2007 and its 14th and updated meeting in Geneva on 23-25 January 2024. The main purpose of the forum is to manage human mobility effectively and sustainably in terms of *source and destination countries* and *transit country* between these two (Immigration Administration Presidency, 2023; World Economic Forum, 2017).

The thematic priorities of the forum are to actively ensure cooperation with participating countries at national, regional and global levels. Measures should be taken to improve migration management and prevent the increasing impact of climate change on migration. The protection of the health, safety and individual rights of migrants is a requirement of human rights. Measures should be established to ensure that labor migration is carried out in a way that supports economic, social and cultural development. Efforts to improve the public perception of migration should be supported. The sustainability of migration policies requires the establishment of good governance mechanisms by providing multifaceted social layers such as NGOs, trade unions, migrant and diaspora representatives (GFMD, 2024).

Otherwise, migration and the immigrant issue will continue to occupy the global agenda. The situation in developed countries, where migrants usually go for a better life, is worsening day by day. The majority of immigrants continue to flock to developed countries (World Economic Forum, 2017). For this reason, sustainable migration policies in developed countries focus on social and political regulations in selective acceptance of immigrants, integration, development of language skills, education, health, employment, legal regulations, fight against discrimination, ensure good governance and most importantly effectively combat the migration and refugee wave. Considering that the world population will reach 10 billion in 2050, it is thought that there will be intense population flows from Asia, Africa and Latin America to high-income countries and regions, especially North America and the EU. This situation brings with it concerns about the concept of sustainable migration (Fertig and Kahanec 2015; OECD, 2023; Ritzen and Kahanec, 2017).


Of course, these concerns are not unfounded. The number of international migrants, which was 173 million in 2000, reached 221 million in 2010 and 281 million in 2020. While international migrants make up 3.6 percent of the world's population, the vast majority of migrants, 65 percent (182 million 650 people), continue to reside in high-income countries. 31 percent of migrants (87 million 110 people) are in middle-income countries and 4 percent (11 million 240 people) are in low-income countries. When the data for 2000-2020 are compared, the proportion of migrants living in high-income countries increased, while the downward trend continued in middle- and low-income countries (Graph 1) (UN-DESA, 2021).



Graph 1. Percentage of international migrants by income group, 2020, source: (UN-DESA, 2021). The data was graphed by the authors.

There are predictions that industrialization and growth in developed economies will slow down over time, unemployment will be felt more in these countries, border policies will harden and the migration burden will shift from developed countries to developing countries. For example, UNDP population-income projections estimate that the number of migrants going to developed regions between 2005 and 2050 will be 98 million, and it is thought that migration will target developing countries in the future. Similar studies predict that Turkey and other North African countries will have to deal with increasing migration from Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East to the Mediterranean in the future (Berriane et al, 2016; Hatton, 2014; Zelka, 1991). Another study conducted

specifically about Turkey drew attention to the fact that *cross-border migration activities that occur in the global process will make developing countries target countries rather than developed countries* (Nar, 2021a). Despite all the opinions and projections, the fact that the international migrant population exceeds 281 million today is a global reality. Of the immigrants, 135 million are women and 146 million are men. Of these immigrants, 169 million people are those who immigrated from their countries only to work as laborers. According to United Nations 2022 data, 108.4 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide. Of these people, 35.3 million are refugees and 5.4 million are asylum seekers. The rest are internally displaced persons (UN, 2022). The main regions hosting displaced people around the world are shown in Graph 2 in percentage terms (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2018; UN, 2022). The interesting thing is that 50% of the population in the refugee and asylum seeker category lives in low-income countries and 25% lives in middle-income countries.



Graph 2. Percentage of regions in the world hosting displaced persons, source: (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2018; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Statistics, 2017; UN, 2022). The data was graphed by the authors.

About half of all migrants are women and girls. Women and children are catalysts for global change and sustainable migration policies because of their ability to impose positive social, cultural and political norms. Today, the number of female migrants slightly exceeds the number of male migrants in Europe, North America and Oceania. This is partly because women have higher life expectancy than men. In sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia, this is associated with labor migration where the male population is higher than the female population (Pijnenburg and Rijken, 2021; UN-DESA, 2021).


Turning points such as the two world wars, the Cold War and terrorist attacks, military actions such as the Syrian civil war, the COVID-19 pandemic and most recently the Russia-Ukraine war have had and continue to have significant impacts on migration and human mobility globally. Due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, approximately 4.7 million Ukrainian refugees migrated to Germany, Poland and the USA (OECD, 2023). In addition, the *European refugee crisis*, which began in 2015 when a large number of migrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa, and Asian countries such as Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan attempted to reach the European continent, continues to be a problem (Park, 2015). It is noteworthy that Belarus has emerged as a hub for transporting refugees to the EU since 2021 with the support of Russia. This has turned the refugee crisis into an opportunity, exerting pressure on Europe and implementing demographic change operations. On the other hand, the Polish government, which shares a border with Belarus, has implemented various policies to safeguard its national and Europe's external borders against illegal immigration (SACD, 2023; Zdanowicz, 2023). Border guards' effectiveness is being enhanced, pushback policies are being implemented, a new 186-kilometer border wall is under construction, and measures are being taken to prevent illegal crossings, including declaring a state of emergency (Jesuit Refugee Service, 2022). However, the determined efforts of individual countries are insufficient in practice, and sustainable approaches require economic, social, and political steps to ensure the stability of countries exporting migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Various reasons, especially the search for security and the desire for a better life, encourage long-distance migration today, as in the past. The top 25 countries targeted by international immigrants from the 1960s to the present are listed in Table 1. Accordingly, the United States is the country hosting the most immigrants in the world with 50 million immigrants. The rate of immigrants corresponds to 15.3% of Americans. India is the country with the least number of immigrants compared to its population, which exceeds one billion (Migration Policy Institute, 2023; UN, 2022).

Graph 3 shows the top 20 global exporters of migrants. India is the largest exporter of migrants globally with 18 million citizens living abroad. Mexico is the second largest source country, with around 11 million citizens living outside the country. The Russian Federation ranks third with 10.8 million people and China fourth with 10 million people. In fifth place is Syria, where more than 8 million people have left the country. Most Syrians have refugee status.

Table 1. Top 25 destinations of international migrants, source: (Migration Policy Institute, 2023; UN, 2017; 2022). Table data was edited by the authors.

Countries	International Migrant Population	Migrant Share %	Total Population
USA	50.633.000	15,3	331.003.000
Germany	15.762.000	18,8	83.784.000
Saudi Arabia	13.455.000	38,6	34.814.000
Russia	11.637.000	8	145.934.000
United Kingdom	9.360.000	13,8	67.886.000
United Arab Emirates	8.716.000	88,1	9.890.000
France	8.525.000	13,1	65.274.000
Canada	8.049.000	21,3	37.742.000
Australia	7.686.000	30,1	25.500.000
Spain	6.842.000	14,6	46.755.000
Italy	6.387.000	10,6	60.462.000
Turkey	6.053.000	7,2	84.339.000
Ukraine	4.997.000	11,4	43.734.000
India	4.879.000	0,4	1.380.004.000
Kazakhstan	3.732.000	19,9	18.777.000
Thailand	3.632.000	5,2	69.800.000
Malaysia	3.477.000	10,7	32.366.000
Jordan	3.458.000	33,9	10.203.000
Pakistan	3.277.000	1,5	220.892.000
Kuwait	3.110.000	72,8	4.271.000
China, Hong Kong SAR	2.962.000	39,5	7.497.000
South Africa	2.860.000	4,8	59.309.000
Iran	2.797.000	3,3	83.993.000
Japan	2.771.000	2,2	126.476.000
Ivory Coast	2.565.000	9,7	26.378.000



Graph 3. Origins of international migrants in 2020 (millions), source: (UN, 2022). The data was edited by the authors

The largest migration corridor in the world is the migration corridor that extends from Mexico to the United States and allows the passage of more than 10 million people approximately. The second largest corridor is the refugee corridor that provides passage from Syria to Turkey. The third major corridor extends from India to the United Arab Emirates and is the route used mostly by labor migrants. The bilateral corridor between Russia and Ukraine is classified as the fourth and fifth largest corridor in the world (UN, 2022).

People who migrate using these and similar methods can create positive and negative effects in the destination country. However, the direction of the resulting effect is open to debate today, as it was yesterday (Clemens, 2011). Considering that 74% of international immigrants are young individuals of working age, this can be considered as a contribution to the growth potential of countries with aging populations. For this reason, migration that increases regional and sectoral overall welfare and creates a win-win relationship between the local and immigrant population can have positive effects. However, the ability of human mobility to be sustainable and permanent, which reduces social benefit, increases inequality and poverty, aggravates environmental problems and targets the demographic structure, is also disappearing (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2018). Therefore, in order to talk about policies for sustainable development, first of all, the concept of development must include migration policies (Pawłowski, 2013), countries must have migration action plans, and migration policies must be associated with governance processes (Gavonel et al, 2021).

Improving the necessary infrastructure access services for immigrants (water, electricity, housing opportunities, technology-based support systems) is essential, not only for immigrants, but also for the sustainability of cities and ecosystems (World Economic Forum, 2017). It is difficult for immigration policies that do not take into account the feelings and thoughts of the country's citizens to be sustainable. Therefore, referendums that take citizens' opinions into account may be useful. Otherwise, immigrants, who politicians see as voting potential, can be cited as a reason for many problems, from increasing crime rates to deteriorating social harmony, as in Turkey and Western European countries. Discriminatory behavior increases, and racist discourses rise.

According to Timmer and Williams (1998), who analyzed migration movements before 1930 in the literature, the difference between income inequalities and unemployment rates between countries is the main reason for migration. According to them, immigrants who leave their country for economic reasons can quickly find jobs because they volunteer to work in areas where labor is scarce, such as cleaning, mining and construction. In addition, these groups, which are seen as voting potential in the US elections, also have to fight against racism, xenophobia and ethnic differences. Stouffer (1940) argued that spatial distance is more important than racial and economic factors for the act of migration. According to Higham (1955), the phenomenon of migration is based on countries' unique historical values, citizenship and nationality ties, social dynamics, and national identity discussions. According to Hoffmann (1960), security problems, strategic issues, and the possibility of actual or potential conflict between states determine migration. Kinman and Lee (1966) drew attention to internal migration movements. They explained that the main reason for the migration of Blacks from the south to the north in the United States is economic as well as an indicator of discriminatory practices. Historical theorists such as Wallerstein (1974) and Piore (1979) argued that the act of migration is affected by *cultural and historical* differences as a part of the modernization and globalization process. Since migrating people move from underdeveloped economies to developed economies, migration is an output of the capitalist system. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the act of migration as an extension of the political-colonial past (Akyıldız, 2016).

Since the 1980s, theoretical studies explaining the relationship between migration and globalization have increased, especially as the process accelerated with globalization. For example, according to the results of research conducted across OECD countries between 1985 and 1995, immigrant stock increased by 62% in parallel with the globalization process. A similar study conducted on immigrants coming to the USA from Australia, South Africa and Mexico proved that the incomes of immigrants increased by 30-40%, but globalization caused a significant decrease in the incomes of domestic workers. This is because cheap labor demands from US companies support migration today, as in the past (Borjas, 1987; Borjas et al, 1991; Lowell, 2005).

Massey and Espinosa (1997) argued that migrants from low-income countries move with the aim of securing higher incomes as well as quality of life and lifetime earnings. Borjas (1999) also argued that the attractiveness of social investments is important in the act of migration. Immigrants coming to the US benefit from welfare benefits at a rate of 25%, while this rate is only 15% for native households. According to Borjas, the social opportunities provided by the welfare state continue to attract large numbers of immigrants, both skilled and unskilled, to the US. In addition, the geographical clustering of immigrants in a small number of cities and states (California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois) can be considered as a requirement of the need for individual security. According to Meyers, migration movements greatly affect not only the economies of societies, but also their demographic structure, culture and politics. However, more time is needed for migration to be seen as a factor of stability or growth in Western societies (Meyers, 2000). According to Castles, globalization flows and international networks have changed the content of migration. New communication and transportation technologies multiply symbols and values such as human mobility, ideas, and cultural flows in a versatile way. Nation-state sovereignty is eroding, sovereignty systems and border controls are weakening, concepts such as material and cultural practices related to migration and trade, multiple identities and multi-layered citizenship are coming to the fore (Castles,

2002). While immigration policies in Europe work more favorably in favor of immigrants, concerns among local people that unemployment benefits will decrease and social problems will increase lead to an increase in public pressure. In order to reduce this pressure, (i) restricting social assistance to new immigrants to the EU and (ii) establishing an EU-wide migration policy are considered priority measures. Immigration restrictions in high-income EU countries towards the newly-joined Eastern European countries are criticized on the grounds that they are incompatible with the EU mission (Boeri and Brücker, 2005).

Restrictive immigration policies are implemented primarily for reasons such as encouraging skilled labor, ensuring the acceptance of high-income immigrants into the country, and increasing competitiveness. However, the main purpose is related to the added value provided to the country's economy in the long term. For example, Canada issues permanent residence permits to attract and retain skilled immigrants. France has revised its immigration laws since 2006, making the admission of highly skilled immigrants to the country a priority. The United Kingdom allows foreigners who graduate from their universities to stay in the country and look for work. Australia selects 50% of skilled immigrant applications from people who have previously studied in Australia (Kalia, 2008). Many skilled workers are migrating from India to developed countries to work in the IT sector (Salt, 2009). According to another study, approximately 10% of the EU workforce consists of immigrants. Again, according to ILO data, today the ratio of the number of international migrant workers in the global workforce is around 5%. Despite this, public opposition to large-scale migration in developed countries is still strong, and the economic effects of migration remain controversial and contradictory (Coleman, 2015; ILO, 2021b).

Global pandemics and diseases (COVID-19, HIV, smallpox, etc.) also affect the volume and complexity of migration. In such cases, countries implement more stringent measures to restrict human mobility. The fact that Floridians in the US banned the passage of New Yorkers in April 2020 due to COVID-19, the Trump administration sent military forces to the Canada-US border, and many countries implemented strict measures against migrants shows the restrictive effects of the pandemic on human mobility. The fact that migrants and refugees were blamed for the inadequacy of a number of public services such as health, education, pensions, social assistance, and especially security, provided to locals during the pandemic, and the increase in acts of violence against migrants in the same period made migration an even more dangerous act. Xenophobia and racism are on the rise, while income inequality and social conflicts are deepening (Nar, 2020; Mountz, 2020; Pawłowski, 2020a). For example, a study of immigrants in France indicated that discrimination and differences become more evident on these three discrimination scales: discrimination in civilian life, discrimination against immigrant qualifications, and ethnic-racial discrimination (Safi, 2023).

Empirical studies revealing the global migration relationship are quite limited in the literature. However, for example, in the study conducted by Boubtane, the relationship between migration-unemployment-growth was discussed within the scope of OECD countries. In the analysis conducted using annual data for the period 1980-2005 for 22 OECD countries, it was concluded that immigrant inflow does not cause unemployment, except for Portugal. On the other hand, in four countries (France, Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom) economic growth caused immigrant inflow, while immigration inflow did not cause economic growth in any country (Boubtane et al, 2013). In a study where the relationship between migration stock and economic growth in EU/EFTA countries was analyzed with the Granger causality test, there was no definite relationship between economic growth and migration (Gomez and Giraldez, 2017). In another study using data from OECD countries for the period 2000-2016, a unidirectional causality relationship was detected from migration rate to GDP (Göv and Dürri, 2017). In another study conducted using data from 2000-2014 for 30 OECD countries, the relationship between globalization and migration was tested with panel causality analysis. Accordingly, while there is a two-way relationship between economic and social globalization and migration, a unidirectional causality relationship was determined between political globalization and migration and from migration to political globalization (Kurt, 2019).

4. Methodology

4.1. Purpose of the research

This study aimed to investigate the relationship between globalization and migration in the context of OECD countries using the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Delay (ARDL) methodology, which is an advanced econometric tool. This research, which deals with globalization in its economic, social and political dimensions, aims to reveal how these dimensions affect the migration burdens of OECD countries. Migration, which is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, is affected by various global factors, the most important of which is the phenomenon of globalization. In today's world, where borders are gradually disappearing, the effects of economic, social and political globalization on the population living in OECD countries, but who are not citizens of that country, are discussed. The panel ARDL approach, used for this purpose and known for its robustness in dealing with cross-section dependence and heterogeneous panels, offers the opportunity to capture both short-term and long-term dynamics in the globalization-migration connection. As a result, the findings of this research are expected to provide valuable information for researchers and stakeholders interested in the intersections of global economic trends and migration policies.

4.2. Data set and method

In the study, the KOF Globalization Index, which was developed by the Swiss Institute of Economic Research as an that measures the level of globalization of countries in a multidimensional way as economic, social and political globalization, was used as the globalization variable. Data were obtained from the KOF Globalization Index database. The migration burden of OECD countries was obtained from the OECD database. Before proceeding with the analysis, the logarithm of the collected data was taken and a common structure was obtained between the data.

5. Findings

5.1. Testing of cross section dependence

Before starting the econometric analysis to determine the relationship between globalization and migration burden in OECD countries, it is necessary to examine the existence of cross-sectional dependency between countries that make up the panel. Cross-sectional dependence is a reflection of a shock that occurs in one of the countries with cross-sectional units to other countries. In order to investigate the existence of cross-sectional dependence, Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Pesaran (2004) developed the tests, and Pesaran et al. (2008) developed the deviation-corrected CD test. At this point, when the time dimension in the panel is greater than the cross-sectional dimension ($T > N$), the Breusch Pagan LM1 test is used; when the time dimension and the cross-sectional size are equal, the Pesaran LM2 test is used; and when the time dimension is less than the cross-sectional size ($N > T$), the Pesaran CD test is used. In this study, since $N=27$, $T=11$ and $N > T$, cross-sectional dependence was examined with Pesaran CD. Table 2 shows the findings of the Pesaran CD test.

Table 2. Cross sectional dependency test

Series	Pesaran CD (p)
LOGMIGRATION	30.6446 (0.0000)
LOGECONOMIC	20.7828 (0.0000)
LOGPOLITIC	9.8266 (0.0000)
LOGSOCIAL	6.7074 (0.0000)

As can be seen in Table 2, since the p-value of the Pesaran CD test for all variables was less than the threshold value of 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected and it was concluded that there was cross-sectional dependency. For this reason, the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test, one of the second generation unit root tests, was used to examine the stationarity of the series.

5.2. Second generation panel unit root tests

Since the variables used in the study had cross-sectional dependence, the CIPS test, one of the second generation unit root tests, was used. CIPS test performs unit root testing by taking into account cross-sectional dependence in panel data sets. The CIPS test examines the existence of unit roots for the series in each section of the panel. The basis of the CIPS test is to take the average value of the unit root tests in each section of the panel (for each country or unit of observation) and calculate a test statistic based on this average. This approach allows evaluation of the unit root presence in each section in the panel in an aggregated manner rather than separately. In the CIPS test, the null hypothesis is the presence of unit roots in all cross-sections (in all countries or units of observation). The alternative hypothesis is that there is no unit root in at least one section. Table 3 shows the findings of the CIPS test.

Table 3. CIPS test

Series	CIPS Stat.	CIPS p	Truncated CIPS Stat.	Truncated CIPS p	Result
LOGMIGRATION	-19.003	≥ 0.10	-18.644	≥ 0.10	Difference
D(LOGMIGRATION)	-41.784	<0.01	-30.335	<0.01	
LOGECONOMIC	-40.688	<0.01	-30.397	<0.01	Level
D(LOGECONOMIC)	-118.847	<0.01	-38.571	<0.01	
LOGPOLITIC	-20.761	≥ 0.10	-20.628	≥ 0.10	Difference
D(LOGPOLITIC)	-56.452	<0.01	-32.714	<0.01	
LOGSOCIAL	-12.852	≥ 0.10	-21.333	<0.10	Difference
D(LOGSOCIAL)	-49.016	<0.01	-32.645	<0.01	

As seen in Table 3, according to the CIPS test results, although the Logeconomic variable is stationary at level, logmigration, logpolitic and logsocial variables are stationary at difference. Since the variables are stationary at different levels, the panel ARDL method was applied as a cointegration test.

5.3. Panel ARDL

The panel ARDL method is an econometric modeling technique used in panel data analysis. This method is an application of the autoregressive distributed delay (ARDL) model developed for time series data in panel data sets. Panel ARDL is a flexible approach that can examine both short-term and long-run dynamics within the same model.

The panel ARDL model has the ability to simultaneously analyze both short-term and long-term relationships between variables. This has the advantage of being able to examine both long-term cointegration relationships, as well as short-term adjustments and transient effects. Panel ARDL is suitable for use in the analysis of variables with different levels of stationarity. Therefore, the model accepts different latency lengths for different variables. At the same time, panel ARDL can be applied in cases with cross-sectional dependence. This means that the model can be used to study how economic shocks and policy changes spread across different countries or observation units.

The results of the CIPS test, one of the second generation unit root tests, revealed that the examined series were stationary at different levels. This necessitates the use of the panel ARDL methodology to determine both short-term and long-term connections between variables. Panel ARDL analyses can be performed by choosing between estimation methods such as dynamic constant effects (CFE), mean group (MG), and mixed (or pooled) mean group (PMG). In order to determine which model is more efficient, the Hausman Test is applied.

In Table 4, the Hausman test was used to determine which of the results of PMG and MG were more significant. PMG and MG are the parameter estimators of the panel ARDL method. The results of the Hausman test statistic ($p > 0.05$) show that the null hypothesis is accepted and the PMG parameter estimator gives more significant results.

Table 4. Hausman test findings

Hausman Test	Stat.	p
Mean Group	3.7796	0.2863
Dynamic Fixed Effects	0.2816	0.9634

Table 5 shows the findings of the panel ARDL model. In the model, the error correction term (ECT) coefficient plays a vital role in symbolizing the error correction process. In this framework, if there is a long-term relationship between the variables, ECT is expected to be statistically significant. This coefficient, which is responsible for showing the time it takes for short-term interactions between variables to reach long-term equilibrium, must be statistically significant and have a value in the range of 0 to -1. As can be seen in Table 5, a 1% increase in economic globalization in the long run increases the migration burden of countries by 0.60%. Similarly, a 1% increase in political globalization before a period increases the migration burden of countries by 0.06%. On the other hand, a 1% increase in social globalization in the previous period reduces the migration burden of countries by 0.48%. In the short term, the error correction term (COINTEQ) coefficient is statistically significant and negative (-0.3868), as expected. This shows that the shocks experienced in the short term disappear in the long term.

Table 5. Findings of the panel ARDL model

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Long-run (Pooled) Coefficients				
LOGECONOMIC	0.6000	0.0777	7.7142	0.0000
D(LOGPOLITIC)	0.0600	0.0107	5.5671	0.0000
D(LOGSOCIAL)	-0.4839	0.0940	-5.1477	0.0000
Short-run (Mean-Group) Coefficients				
COINTEQ	-0.3868	0.0899	-4.3012	0.0000
D(FARKLOGPOLITIC)	-1.1235	1.0802	-1.0400	0.2994
C	1.8182	0.4196	4.3328	0.0000
@TREND	0.0099	0.0040	2.4730	0.0141

6. Conclusion

The fact that migration is not sustainable in nature, whether it is regular or irregular, in the form of refugees or asylum seekers, causes a wide variety of social and economic problems within the global network of relations. Therefore, the concepts of globalization-migration-sustainability are considered terms that describe complex and dynamic processes that are intertwined. This study, in which the relations between immigrant stock and globalization (social, political, economic) were analyzed with the panel ARDL method, aims to make current processes more understandable and applicable.

According to the results of the analysis: (i) a 1% increase in economic globalization increases countries' migration burden by 0.60%, (ii) a 1% increase in political globalization increases countries' migration burden by 0.06%, and (iii) a 1% increase in social globalization decreases countries' migration burden by 0.48%. When the results are evaluated, economic and political globalization has a positive role in the migration burden of countries (increasing the migration burden) and social globalization has a reducing role in the migration burden. This finding shows that the elimination of social differences between countries has a reducing effect on the migration burden of countries, so the way to reduce the foreign national population in countries is to eliminate social inequality. However, as economic and political globalization increases, the burden of migration also increases. Economic globalization increases the mobility of capital and labor, which in turn reinforces imbalances in labor markets and the search for economic opportunity. That is, individuals seeking better economic opportunities are more likely to migrate. Political globalization, on the other hand, can influence migration policies through international political relations and agreements, thus allowing more people to cross international borders. This can increase a country's migration burden. These findings highlight the importance of considering the different dimensions of globalization in shaping migration policies. In an economically and politically globalized world, focusing on increasing social equity and justice in managing the migration burden can contribute to the creation of more balanced and sustainable migration policies.

Looking at the long-term graphs of the panel cointegration relationship (Annex 1), the effects of economic and political globalization on the migration burden can be seen in Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg and Norway. In other words, Central Europe and Scandinavian countries experience an increase in migration burden with globalization. Of these countries, France and Italy have already received heavily immigration from Africa, while other countries are exposed to increasing migration burden as they become global due to their relatively small populations.

In Germany, Switzerland, Israel, Hungary, the United Kingdom and the United States, migration burden data vary. The uncertainty in the immigration stock is explained by factors such as national security concerns arising from the September 11 attacks in the USA, hawkish approaches that may be periodic, the increase in racism, election periods and vote concerns, and capital's demand for cheap labor explain. Public pressure and uncertainties caused by Germany hosting a large immigrant/refugee population lead to fluctuation in the immigrant stock. Again, the rise of right-wing parties in Switzerland, Israel, Hungary and the UK may explain the variability in migration movements. In these countries, the working class, who usually vote for left-wing ideology, now vote for *right-wing parties* that oppose immigration policies, which the working class see as a threat to their jobs. It is no coincidence that the far right has taken over in France, which was once seen as a stronghold of the left. Similar reasons exist in the northern regions of the UK, where the Labour Party was strong, but who are now voting for far-right parties (Achterberg and Houtman, 2006; Nar, 2021c). Likewise, anti-immigrant policies are behind the victory of the leftist ideology affiliated with the Democratic Party in America by voting for the Republican Party (conservatives) (Frank, 2018). Therefore, the environment of insecurity brought about by globalization and the perception of economic risk are the main reasons for the change in attitudes of left-wing voters (Vowles and Xezonakis, 2016).

Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are concerned about the dense immigrant population coming from countries with different religious backgrounds and different cultures and are cautious about their immigration policies (Ritzen and Kahanec, 2017). Despite its strong economy and low population, Iceland is a country that sends emigrants as it becomes more global. This situation can be explained by the challenging climatic conditions, as well as the country being isolated from other societies and its introverted social structure from the 9th century to the 20th century. However, the country that sends the most immigrants to Iceland is Poland, comprising 35.9% of immigrants (Çaldıran, 2023; Salik, 2023).

Another important result is that as social globalization increases, the burden of migration decreases. This finding indicates that the migration burden of countries can be alleviated by reducing social differences and inequalities between countries. According to this result, focusing on reducing social inequalities and increasing social justice in order to manage the migration burden is necessary for more balanced and sustainable migration policies. Wade (2014) stated that social rights such as education, health, better living conditions, access to labor markets, the level of benefit from public goods, being safe, and the degree of being able to use democratic rights can only gain meaning if equality of opportunity is achieved. Otherwise, in societies where social inequalities are widespread, humanitarian concerns feed, grow and support the act of migration. At this point, the field of *transfers*, one of the

elements of social globalization, significantly contributes to reducing social inequalities. This is because individual international transfers paid and received always result in some form of personal and social interaction. For example, social globalization mechanisms enabled individual immigrants to provide global international remittances worth \$702 billion in 2020, and to transfer a significant portion of this monetary amount of \$540 billion to low- and middle-income countries. On the other hand, global international transfers (unpaid aid, administrative-logistical support) can similarly reduce the migration burden of target countries and enable the development of social relations. Projection studies that draw attention to this situation also predict that there may be a significant decrease in the migration burden from third world countries to developed countries in the future. However, this prediction may be shaped depending on the seriousness of developed countries in ensuring border security, as well as the support that developed countries will provide to eliminating global social inequalities.

The concept of *sustainability*, which includes many areas ranging from ethical, ecological, social, economic, technical, legal and political issues (Pawłowski, 2020b), has meaning only to the extent that it includes migration policies that are worthy of human dignity, safe, orderly, controllable and do not disrupt the demographic structure. For this purpose, it is necessary to create migration strategy policies, to effectively carry out presentation, management, planning, implementation and distribution of international transfers, to integrate immigrants into economic and social life, to increase the attractiveness of voluntary repatriation mechanisms, and moreover, to understand the importance of the concept of migration in all its aspects.

Perhaps it may be useful to note the importance of the concept of migration in the works of the world-renowned Turkish Sumerologist Prof. Dr. Muazzez İlmiye ÇİĞ and in the clay tablet of a sage describing the last days of the Sumerians. The sage says that *some Sumerians looked at cheap labor as slaves, so they turned a blind eye and did not care. As the Akkadians (Arabs) came to the Sumerian country, they came and came, and they began to over-populate and form large clusters of people. Within 150 years, things had changed so much that the Akkadians gathered and organized themselves and started looting and burning down cities.... They killed the Sumerians and seized power.... We couldn't realize.... We are late.... God forgive us... maybe those who come after us will read this and take a lesson from it* (Güç, 2023).

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