

Global Resilience in the Face of Aggression: An Analysis of Sanctions Pressure on Russia's Economy

Globalna resilencja w obliczu agresji: analiza presji sankcji na gospodarkę Rosji

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Abstract

This study examines the unprecedented scale of international sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, highlighting their critical role as a tool for economic pressure amid intense geopolitical instability. The primary objective was to quantify the intensity and assess the effectiveness of the international community's sanction policy toward Russia from 2022 to 2025. Employing a multi-faceted methodology, including comparative and statistical analysis, the research utilizes data from the Russia Sanctions Dashboard, Statista Research Department, and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

Core findings reveal that after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the number of sanctions grew almost tenfold, an unprecedented event in international practice. These measures target a wide array of economic sectors – from finance to technology – and key individuals, driven by Russia's violations of international law and territorial annexations. Unprecedented military aggression constitutes a profound global crisis multiplier, precipitating a systemic regression across the entire matrix of the UN SDGs. Consequently, the trajectory for realizing the SDGs necessitates an immediate cessation of hostilities, given that the protracted duration of the conflict directly correlates with the deepening of the global economic crisis; this inevitably intensifies global poverty and food insecurity, substantially widening the critical gap between current progress and the requisite outcomes for fulfilling the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The observed dynamics show a clear strategic shift, solidifying Russia's position as the primary target of economic isolation, with 2024 focusing on limiting critical technology imports and disrupting *sanction hubs*. However, their effectiveness was partially hampered by Russia's adaptive resilience and ability to find alternative export markets.

The practical value of this research lies in providing a framework to optimize international sanction policy, enhancing mechanisms to prevent evasion, strengthening global coordination, and implementing new restrictions to diminish Russia's economic capacity and reinforce international security. Future research should concentrate on refining enforcement control systems and developing new strategies for capping the price and limiting the volume of Russian energy resources.

Key words: geopolitical instability, economic resilience, international cooperation, sanction efficacy, international sanction policy

Streszczenie

Niniejszy artykuł analizuje bezprecedensową skalę międzynarodowych sankcji nałożonych na Federację Rosyjską, podkreślając ich kluczową rolę jako narzędzia presji gospodarczej w obliczu intensywniej niestabilności geopolitycznej. Głównym celem było ilościowe określenie intensywności i ocena skuteczności polityki sankcji społecz-

ności międzynarodowej wobec Rosji w latach 2022–2025. Wykorzystując wieloaspektową metodologię, obejmującą analizę porównawczą i statystyczną, badanie wykorzystuje dane z Russia Sanctions Dashboard, Departamentu Badań Statista oraz Misji Monitorującej Prawa Człowieka ONZ na Ukrainie.

Główne ustalenia wskazują, że po pełnej inwazji na Ukrainę liczba sankcji wzrosła prawie dziesięciokrotnie, co jest wydarzeniem bezprecedensowym w praktyce międzynarodowej. Środki te są wymierzone w szeroki wachlarz sektorów gospodarki – od finansów po technologię – oraz w kluczowe osoby, a ich przyczyną są naruszenia prawa międzynarodowego i aneksje terytorialne Rosji. Ta agresja bezpośrednio zagraża globalnej resilencji i podważa Cele Zrównoważonego Rozwoju ONZ nr 8, 16 i 17. Sankcje sektorowe, zwłaszcza dotyczące energii i technologii, okazały się najbardziej skuteczne. Obserwowana dynamika wskazuje na wyraźną zmianę strategiczną, umacniającą pozycję Rosji jako głównego celu izolacji gospodarczej. Rosja będzie koncentrować się na ograniczeniu importu kluczowych technologii i dezorganizacji *centrów sankcji*. Jednak ich skuteczność została częściowo ograniczona przez zdolność adaptacyjną Rosji do znajdowania alternatywnych rynków eksportowych.

Praktyczna wartość tych badań polega na stworzeniu ram do optymalizacji międzynarodowej polityki sankcji, wzmocnieniu mechanizmów zapobiegających ich unikaniu, wzmocnieniu globalnej koordynacji oraz wprowadzeniu nowych ograniczeń w celu zmniejszenia potencjału gospodarczego Rosji i wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. Przyszłe badania powinny koncentrować się na udoskonaleniu systemów kontroli egzekwowania przepisów oraz opracowaniu nowych strategii ograniczania cen i wolumenu rosyjskich zasobów energetycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: niestabilność geopolityczna, resilencja ekonomiczna, współpraca międzynarodowa, skuteczność sankcji, międzynarodowa polityka sankcji

1. Introduction

This study analyzes the multifaceted nature of global resilience, demonstrating how it is tested and reinforced through the unprecedented escalation of sanctions against the Russian Federation. This response has intensified due to persistent authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and the flagrant violation of international law. The initial restrictive measures, implemented after the 2014 aggression in Crimea and Donbas, have evolved into a vast, cumulative sanctions regime following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Portela et al., 2020). This collective action serves as a deliberate, coercive instrument designed to restore global justice and strengthen the rule of law.

The core of this research is founded on the premise that global aggression fundamentally undermines the framework of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Russia's aggression precipitates a systemic regression across the entire framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2015), effectively functioning as a global crisis multiplier that generates pervasive risks impacting all goals. This destructive influence acutely compromises the requisite international cooperation and policy coherence indispensable for the realization of the global sustainable development agenda.

The international community has mobilized an unprecedented number of sanctions, viewing them as a crucial tool for political and economic influence to weaken Russia's military capabilities. The conflict, however, is not just a military-economic confrontation; it is also a clash of ideological and narrative constructs that shape adaptive responses to challenges to the Liberal International Order (Wiesner, 2025). This ideological dimension is a key factor that determines the legitimacy and coherence of the sanction policy.

The sanctions against Russia have significant transnational economic effects, impacting not only Russia's internal stability but also generating global economic consequences, including a projected 1.4% reduction in global GDP (Hatipoglu et al., 2022; Tong, 2024). This makes an in-depth analysis of the sanctions phenomenon essential. Sanctions have thus become a pivotal indicator of the global community's commitment to collective security and the resilience of international legal frameworks.

The primary objective of this study is to provide a holistic analysis of the intensity, dynamics, and geographical distribution of sanctions from 2022 to 2025. Using statistical data, this research aims to comprehensively evaluate the scale, efficacy, and relevance of international economic accountability. The novelty of this study lies in framing the sanction policy as a coordinated, multi-level mechanism, rather than a series of isolated political acts. This mechanism constantly adapts in response to escalating security, economic, and humanitarian crises on a global scale. The study, therefore, offers a comprehensive assessment of the economic pressure and its effectiveness as an instrument of international responsibility.

2. Literature review

The field of international sanctions has gained significant academic prominence due to heightened modern geopolitical instability. Sanctions are analyzed as a multifaceted instrument of coercion and accountability, a perspective supported by scholars like Gedeshiński D. E. (2024), who has provided a conceptual framework for categorizing

sanctions based on their legal function, their implementers, and the specific impact they generate. This view highlights their role in upholding international legal norms.

Pliekhov M. V. (2024) explores the financial and legal aspects of these measures, identifying a notable deficiency in Ukrainian law: the absence of a precise legal definition for *financial and legal responsibility*. He posits that financial sanctions are a fundamental mechanism for enforcing legal compliance and safeguarding public interests within the financial domain.

Marych A. V. (2024) investigates the efficacy and limitations of sanctions imposed by international bodies such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, and the IMF. This research points out that the lack of robust enforcement mechanisms in some of these organizations creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited by states seeking to circumvent international law.

The interpretation of sanctions within international law is a key point of scholarly debate. Karlyuha Ye. K. (2024) differentiates between two primary approaches: a broad interpretation encompassing both individual countermeasures and collective UN actions, and a narrow one limited to measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The author notes that the narrow perspective currently prevails in contemporary legal doctrine.

Dukhnevych A. V. and Karpinska N. V. (2024) delve into the effects of sanctions on the rights and freedoms of economic entities, presenting a detailed typology of these restrictive measures.

Further analysis by Sharenko M. S., Pilat O. V., and Sumtsova S. O. (2024) focuses on financial sanctions as a widely used form of economic influence. Their work confirms the superior effectiveness of multilateral sanction regimes that integrate various restrictions. They also quantify the direct macroeconomic effects on targeted states, including currency devaluation, inflation, and a decrease in GDP.

Lykhvar V. V. (2024) examines the concept of state political responsibility enforced through sanctions, defining them as a legitimate instrument of international legal response to violations. He emphasizes their legal foundation in the context of both armed and unarmed coercion.

Matviychuk N. V. (2022) explores the foreign policy dimension of sanctions, arguing that they have become a pivotal 21st-century tool for influencing states in response to international law violations.

Mulyavka V. S. (2024) systematically categorizes sanctions into economic, diplomatic, and military types. His research scrutinizes the objectives and potential outcomes of these measures, as well as their interrelationship with other foreign policy tools.

The impact of sanctions on international commercial relations is a central theme for Ratushny S. M. and Namyasenko O. K. (2024). Their study outlines how sanctions directly disrupt trade, investments, and customs procedures. A quantitative assessment based on a global trade equilibrium model (Hosoe, 2023) predicts that a complete import tariff and export tax could lead to a 3-7% reduction in Russia's GDP.

Synthesizing these theoretical frameworks provides a comprehensive understanding of sanctions as a universal mechanism of accountability. The divergence in academic approaches to classifying and evaluating sanctions highlights a critical need for a unified methodology to analyze their impact amidst new global challenges.

Assessing the practical effectiveness of sanctions is crucial for understanding their capacity to weaken an aggressor state's potential. Dyachenko O.V. (2022) conducted a detailed analysis of the complex impact of sanctions on the Russian economy at the outset of the full-scale invasion.

Shnyrkov O. O. and Antonov D. V. (2023) note that the overall effect of the record number of sanctions against Russia has been moderate due to their predominantly personal nature, while sectoral restrictions, particularly on energy, have proven more effective. The authors mention that challenges with data availability and inconsistency complicate empirical research (Tuzova & Qayum, 2016).

Kuzioma O., Nahachevska T. and Bohachuk O. (2023) confirm the negative trends in Russia's financial system, citing reduced access to international credit and diminished investment activity. Furthermore, Granger causality bootstrap tests confirm the interdependence between oil prices and wage arrears (Su, Qin, Tao, & Umar, 2020), underscoring Russia's macroeconomic vulnerability to oil market fluctuations.

In the domain of foreign economic activity, Studinska H. Y. (2023) points out that sanctions have resulted in a decline in trade, increased logistics costs, and a forced reorientation toward less profitable markets.

Bradov V. V. (2023) analyzes the use of sanctions for information security, specifically the blocking of Russian propaganda media in Western countries. This strategy has successfully reduced the global reach of Russian disinformation.

Finally, Levin V. I. (2023) proposes the use of arrested Russian assets for Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. This includes the potential for creating industrial hubs from confiscated property and funding long-term support programs, which would serve as both a recovery mechanism and an additional lever of pressure on the Russian Federation.

Based on this review, the issue of international sanctions against Russia is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses legal, economic, and political dimensions.

3. Methodology

The methodological approach to investigating sanction policy is fundamentally grounded in the principles of systemic analysis, which enables the holistic evaluation of economic pressure as a multidimensional instrument of international accountability. This framework prioritizes the concept of *smart sanctions*, designed for a targeted impact on specific economic sectors to maximize their efficacy against an aggressor regime while mitigating collateral damage to the civilian population.

To achieve this objective, the following methodological approaches were employed: comparative analysis of sanction measures, statistical and structural-dynamic analysis, as well as graphical interpretation of empirical data. The research relies on empirical data from the «Russia Sanctions Dashboard» (Castellum.AI, 2025), Statista Research Department, and official reports from the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. These sources collectively provide objective information on the volume and typology of sanctions up to August 15, 2025. This allows for a nuanced, sectoral differentiation of pressure by targets (individuals, legal entities, etc.), initiating countries, and types of restrictions, thereby revealing key trends and shifts in sanction dynamics.

The source base is augmented by official sanction lists from the governments of key initiating countries (USA, EU, Canada, UK) and international organizations. The experimental foundation also includes a comparative analysis of sanction measures against Russia and other countries subjected to international pressure, with a focus on the specifics of restrictions and their impact on particular economic sectors of Russia, notably the energy, financial, and technological spheres.

The chronological scope of the study spans the period from early 2022 to August 2025, which permits tracking the evolution of sanction pressure following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specific attention is given to the analysis of periods of intensified sanction measures that coincided with key events of the conflict, including violations of international law, war crimes, and other high-profile incidents.

The applied methods and diverse data sources ensure the high scientific reliability and reproducibility of the study. Through clear criteria for data selection and standardized methods of comparative analysis, the replication of this research is entirely feasible, contributing to the validation of the obtained results. This comprehensive approach not only assesses the current state of sanction pressure on Russia but also forms a robust methodological basis for future analyses of sanction effectiveness in a broader global context.

4. Results & discussion

4.1. General overview and scope of sanctions

In response to the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the global community has implemented an unprecedented and sustained volume of economic sanctions. These legitimate restrictions, serving as a foundational instrument for maintaining international order, have become a pivotal means of pressure aimed at strategically isolating the aggressor state from the global economic sphere. The analysis of sanction statistics through the lens of quantitative indicators is essential for assessing the comprehensive scale and dynamics of economic impact on the Russian Federation, as well as for comprehending the degree of global involvement in this process. This forms the methodological foundation for a deeper conceptualization of the actual state of the Russian Federation's economic isolation.

The initial stage of investigating global economic isolation involves a systematic analysis of the total volume of internationally imposed sanctions (Fig. 1). This approach provides a robust framework for the comparative analysis of the intensity of sanctions pressure on different nations. In this context, the situation concerning the Russian Federation is particularly noteworthy, given that the implementation of sanctions has reached an unprecedented scale.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, there have been fundamental shifts in the global landscape of international sanctions. Prior to this pivotal event, Iran was the primary target of sanctions, facing 3616 restrictions due to its prolonged nuclear program dispute with the West, support for designated terrorist groups, and interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations.

Despite the preservation of a significant cumulative volume of sanctions, Iran did not demonstrate a substantial intensification of sanction pressure after 2022, receiving only 2411 new restrictions. This is partially attributable to the exhaustion of sanction potential against it prior to the active imposition of restrictions against the Russian Federation, as key sanctions had already been implemented years earlier. Additionally, a reorientation of the international community's focus towards the military conflict in Europe was observed. An analogous trend is characteristic of Syria, where only 295 new restrictions were added to 2598 existing sanctions by 2022. Such dynamics are predicated on the protracted nature of the conflict since 2011 and the prior implementation of the majority of sanctions, particularly for war crimes, the use of chemical weapons, and close collaboration with Iran and the Russian Federation.




Figure 1. Total volume of international sanctions against countries, units, Source: Constructed based on data from (Castellum.AI, 2025).

In the case of North Korea, which is already under severe sanction pressure due to nuclear tests and the persistent threat to regional stability, the additional 187 sanctions imposed after 2022 underscore the limited capacity of the international community to intensify pressure on an already isolated state. Venezuela and Myanmar also demonstrate an increase in the number of sanctions – by 210 and 588 restrictions, respectively – which correlates with the deterioration of their internal political situations. In Venezuela, this is attributable to ongoing human rights violations, the authoritarian tendencies of the Maduro regime, and persistent economic instability. Regarding Myanmar, the intensified sanction pressure is a direct consequence of the military coup in 2021 and widespread repression against the civilian population.

Following the invasion by the Russian Federation, the sanction paradigm underwent a cardinal transformation: the number of restrictions against the Russian Federation increased almost tenfold, representing an unprecedented phenomenon in the global history of sanction practice. The primary determinants of this surge were the systematic violation of international law, war crimes, annexation of territories, and aggressive rhetoric posing a threat to European security. The sanction dynamics concerning Belarus, where an increase of 1112 sanctions was recorded, is a direct consequence of its collaboration in the war against Ukraine as an ally of the Russian Federation, the provision of territory for intervention, and general facilitation of aggression. This increase stands out as one of the most significant after the Russian Federation, attesting to the active stance of the West regarding secondary accountability. Overall, the sanction dynamics after February 24, 2022, clearly identify the transformation of international community priorities and designate the Russian Federation as the key object of economic isolation policy. It is essential to emphasize that this unprecedented military aggression is inducing a systemic regression across the entire spectrum of the SDGs, as the war functions as a global crisis multiplier, generating risks that affect all 17 SDGs. This destructive impact severely disrupts the international cooperation and policy coherence necessary for the realization of the global sustainable development agenda in 2023. This war represents the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Second World War and carries devastating consequences for the daily lives of people worldwide.

The escalation of aggression exerts a direct and devastating impact on the realization of SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth). At the national level in Ukraine, the poverty rate (defined by income below the actual subsistence minimum) surged by a factor of 1.7, effectively negating previous progress and reverting the country to 2017 indicators (Cherenko, 2024). Critically, the growth in extreme poverty (income below the legally established minimum) escalated by nearly sevenfold, rising from 1.3% in 2021 to 8.8% in 2023. On a global scale, the conflict-induced surge in energy and commodity prices amplifies poverty and economic disparities, particularly within vulnerable economies. Specifically, projections for the Caucasus and Central Asia region indicate an average increase in the poverty rate of 1 percentage point, subsequently pushing nearly an additional 1 million people below the poverty line in the near term (Hlayhel et al., 2022).

The military conflict induces a systemic reversal of progress toward SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), destabilizing all four key dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilization, and stability). This is driven by exogenous shocks to global markets where the conflict parties hold a critical share: 17% of global wheat exports and 50% of sunflower exports. The FAO Food Price Index reached a historical peak in February 2022, marking a 21% increase year-over-year, and long-term forecasts suggest the crisis could lead to undernourishment for 61 to 107 million

people (El Bilali & Ben Hassen, 2024). According to the FAO Report, the projected number of people facing hunger in 2030 will increase by 23 million due to the war in Ukraine. The impact on SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) extends to global energy systems: the war specifically reduces the robustness (reliability) of energy systems, promotes the fragmentation of network structures, and lowers the transport efficiency of energy carriers (Ke et al., 2025). In the social dimension, the escalation of food and energy prices nullified the advantages of clean energy solutions. For instance, in urban areas of Africa, families, forced to spend a greater portion of their income on expensive food, reduced their average monthly consumption of clean LPG for cooking by two-thirds, representing a critical regression in clean cooking (EFD Initiative, 2024). Furthermore, the invasion has had devastating consequences for SDG 4 (Quality Education) and Ukraine's human capital: damaged or destroyed educational institutions, and an additional burden on the education systems of refugee-hosting countries (Cherevko, 2024). The impact on SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being) is transnational, manifesting as increased anxiety and stress globally. The achievement of SDG 5 (Gender Equality) is affected by the war through the intensification of human trafficking, gender-based and sexual violence, and the loss of vital sources of income for women and girls.

The military conflict acts as a catalyst for exacerbated inequalities, fundamentally compromising the attainment of SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). This crisis disproportionately impacts *the poorest people in the poorest countries* (Hlayhel et al., 2022), while at the international level, profound economic disparities are being exacerbated between commodity-exporting nations and importing economies grappling with severe inflationary shocks. This inequality effect is a direct determinant in the deceleration of global economic growth rates (Cherevko, 2024). Furthermore, the extensive destruction of urban infrastructure and housing stock in Ukraine, directly resulting from military operations, constitutes a formidable impediment to the achievement of SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), necessitating colossal financial investment for post-conflict reconstruction. The conflict has also resulted in the infringement of responsible consumption and production tenets, effectively nullifying progress towards SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), primarily through critical disruptions within global supply chains, precipitated by both sanctions and military engagement. The consequential disruption of resource flows is further stimulating unsustainable consumption and production patterns, including extensive land use, accelerated deforestation, and an increase in carbon losses. Finally, the environmental ramifications of hostilities severely compromise SDG 15 (Life on Land): vast tracts of territory, encompassing forests and protected areas, are contaminated by explosive remnants and chemical elements, while widespread soil degradation and biodiversity loss pose a profound threat to ecosystems, necessitating decades and substantial financial resources for their comprehensive restoration.

Military actions have inflicted damage upon facilities crucial for SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), causing disruptions in water supply. Furthermore, the contamination of water sources with explosives and heavy metals poses a direct threat to water resource quality, representing a regression concerning SDG 14 (Life Below Water). Concurrently, the deliberate destruction of infrastructure, which is a key component of SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure), coupled with large-scale environmental pollution, generates long-term risks for SDG 13 (Climate Action). The infrastructural damage in Ukraine, whose total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at nearly \$524 billion USD as of the end of 2024 – a sum almost triple the country's GDP and equivalent to 0.46% of global GDP – necessitates multi-year restoration efforts (European Union et al., 2025; International Monetary Fund, 2025).

The military aggression constitutes a direct violation of international law, which fundamentally undermines the foundations of SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). The persistence of the conflict and the high level of attrition, with human losses exceeding 1.1 million people, directly contradict the objective of promoting peaceful societies (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025). This escalation of hybrid activity, including sabotage campaigns that leverage a *gig economy* approach to evade attribution, deliberately compromises Europe's institutional resilience and the rule of law (Edwards & Seidenstein, 2025). Consequently, the breakdown of the Liberal International Order is leading to the formation of a *deglobalized*, conflict-ridden world (Cherevko, 2024). This systemic regressive shift renders progress toward achieving all Sustainable Development Goals virtually impossible without a renewed respect for international law and global cooperation mechanisms.

4.2. The dynamics of sanctions and their economic impact

Russia currently occupies a leading position in terms of the number of sanctions imposed against it. This underscores a systemic and large-scale approach by the global community to exert economic pressure. Figure 2 visually represents the overarching landscape of the Russian Federation's economic isolation. The recorded volume of restrictions constitutes an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of sanction policy.

The dynamics of sanctions against the Russian Federation from February 2022 to August 2025 illustrate an economic isolation process unprecedented in its scale and duration, underscoring the international community's strategic resilience. This period was marked by an increase in the number of imposed restrictions from 2613 to 25691 units. The first significant surge in sanction activity occurred within days following February 24, 2022 – the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By February 25, the volume of sanctions had almost doubled to 4777 units,




Figure 2. Dynamics of the total number of sanctions against the Russian Federation and GDP growth rates for the period 2022-2025, units, source: Constructed based on data from (Castellum.AI, 2025; Statista, 2025; United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025).

which was a direct consequence of the swift reaction of key international actors, including the USA, EU, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and others. The implementation of the initial packages included asset freezes, the disconnection of some banks from SWIFT, personal sanctions against top leadership and oligarchs, as well as restrictions in the financial, transport, and high-technology sectors.

In March 2022, the pace of sanction pressure remained high, with a systematic increase to 5334 sanctions by March 4, in response to war crimes and the targeted bombardment of civilian infrastructure. A new peak in April 2022, with a rise from 7749 to 8813 sanctions, was a direct result of the verification of mass war crimes in Bucha and Irpin. In response, the West significantly strengthened its sanction toolkit, introducing an oil embargo, a ban on technology exports, and restrictions for key Russian banks.

In the second half of 2022, the growth in the volume of sanctions maintained a positive dynamic, though its pace was less intensive. This trend was partially attributable to the extensive coverage of potential targets by previous sanction waves. However, the implementation of new restrictions continued in response to mobilization, the conduct of illegitimate referendums in occupied territories, and the instrumentalization of energy as a means of blackmail. By December 2022, the volume of sanctions reached 12634 units, which confirmed continuous pressure from the international community, even despite the gradual exhaustion of traditional instruments.

The year 2023 was marked by a gradual but stable increase in the number of sanctions. A significant update of restrictions occurred in February 2023, correlating with the anniversary of the invasion, when over 1700 new sanctions were implemented within a few days. During this period, sanctions acquired a more targeted character: they were imposed against drone suppliers, companies in third countries facilitating the circumvention of the Russian Federation's sanction regime, and against propaganda structures. By the end of 2023, the volume of sanctions exceeded 23000, reflecting systemic activity to enhance secondary control and combat mechanisms of sanction evasion.

Throughout 2024, the emphases of sanction policy shifted towards limiting the import of critical technologies, combating *sanction hubs* in third countries (notably in Turkey, Kazakhstan, UAE), as well as sectoral restrictions in metallurgy, nuclear industry, and energy. Another significant increase of almost 1000 units occurred in a single week after February 24, 2024, a reaction to both the second anniversary of the invasion and the escalation of hostilities. Russia's attempts to intervene in Western electoral processes and support for other authoritarian regimes also triggered additional restrictions. As of August 15, 2025, the total volume of sanctions stands at 25691 units and continues to grow.

The sanction statistics clearly demonstrate both the scale and consistency of Russia's economic isolation. Each new wave of sanctions correlates with specific events, underscoring a responsive and strategically long-term character of global sanction policy in the pursuit of international security and stability.

Concurrently, the analysis of Russia's GDP dynamics for 2022–2025 demonstrates a pronounced resilience of the Russian economy to exogenous shocks in the short to medium term. This divergence between the exponential

growth of sanction pressure and the relative stability of macroeconomic indicators is explained by Russia's significant adaptive capacity, which manifested through a favorable global commodity market, effective reorientation of export flows, the development of sanction circumvention mechanisms, and adaptive fiscal and monetary policies. While this short-term stability might nullify some targeted pressure, it does not negate the cumulative effect. The increasing number of sanctions will inevitably manifest in the long term, creating significant structural limitations and systemic risks for Russia's economy, ultimately testing its long-term resilience against global pressure.

4.3. Geographical distribution of sanction initiators

For a comprehensive understanding of the structure of international economic pressure on the Russian Federation, an analysis of the initiators of sanction policy is pertinent (Fig. 3).




Figure 3. Volume of sanctions against Russia by sanctioning countries in January-August, 2025 (units), source: constructed based on data from (Castellum.AI, 2025).

The analysis of sanction activity by various nations as of August 15, 2025, provides a clear picture of global resilience in the face of aggression. This response, which underscores a unified commitment to international law, allows for an assessment of both the sheer scale of the reaction and the specific policies of individual states. The United States of America stands as the unwavering leader in the number of imposed restrictions, with a figure of 7392 sanctions. This dominant role is determined by its global influence in finance, security, and technology, as well as the consistent political will of the Biden administration. The American sanction toolkit is remarkably broad, encompassing the defense sector, banking system, IT companies, entities facilitating evasion, and individuals affiliated with the Russian Federation's military-industrial complex. Notably, the USA also actively applies secondary sanctions – targeting companies and citizens of third countries who assist the aggressor, thereby strengthening the transnational dimension of global economic pressure.

Canada, with 4176 sanctions, ranks second, demonstrating its firm solidarity with the transatlantic alliance. This position is a result of close ties and a stringent domestic sanction policy. Canada has applied restrictive measures against propaganda media, affiliated religious structures, private individuals, and companies in the extractive industry. A key characteristic of Canada's strategy is its strategic synchronization with American and British restriction packages, reflecting a coordinated international front.

The EU's sanctions, based on regulatory legal acts of the Council of the EU, guarantee their clearly defined, legitimate, and consistent nature as an instrument of international pressure (Olshak, 2023). The EU's policy has evolved from a national instrument to a collective means of foreign policy influence, aimed at the protection of pan-European values. This transformation included a shift from targeted to comprehensive sectoral sanctions (Meissner & Graziani, 2023). The intensification of the EU's policy has strengthened its global geopolitical role as an actor that consolidates international law and the rule of law (Shamraeva, 2022), and it has also facilitated the adherence of third countries to its restrictive measures (Cardwell & Moret, 2022). The EU's response to Russia's war represents a case of *resilience through evolution*, demonstrating its capacity to transform while preserving fundamental values and strengthening its role on the global stage (Juncos & Pratt, 2024). The consistency of this support is deeply correlated with the protection of European values, the EU's positive image, and the identification of Russian aggression as an existential threat to European security (Martín & Indelicato, 2025).

The European Union, having implemented 2,782 sanctions, demonstrates a cohesive but complex position as a unified integrational entity. On one hand, the EU has responded with resolve to key events, including the full-scale invasion, atrocities in Bucha, and attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. On the other, internal political and economic complexities among member states have complicated consensus on radical decisions, such as a complete cessation of reliance on Russian energy carriers. The EU's sanction policy is strategically formulated based on three key vectors: humanitarian (to minimize civilian impact), domestic political (to minimize economic losses for member states), and geopolitical (to maximize costs for the Russian Federation).

EU sanctions, encompassing the financial sector, aviation, transport, dual-use goods, and critical technologies, exert a significant impact on Russia's economic stability. The aggressor has already lost 210 billion euros in reserves, while its oil and gas revenues have declined by 80%. The growing budget deficit, official inflation exceeding 10%, and a sixfold increase in the cost of imported technologies and critical goods underscore the economic strain (European External Action Service, 2025).

Amidst the ongoing war, the EU has developed its 18th and is currently working on its 19th package of sanctions, aiming to intensify pressure on Russia's energy and banking sectors. This demonstrates consistent global resolve. However, the implementation and coherence of this policy face challenges, notably from blockades by Slovakia and Hungary, which highlight internal political complexities. The more than one-month delay in adopting the 18th package further illustrates the difficulty of reaching political consensus on such robust measures.

These governmental divergences are compounded by the heterogeneity of public sentiments. In Germany, for instance, citizens of Russian and Turkish migrant origin demonstrate less support for sanctions (Debus et al., 2025). This is a particularly relevant aspect, as approximately 3 million migrants from former Soviet Union countries constitute about 3.5% of Germany's population, forming the largest group of immigrants with voting rights (Ryzhova, 2024). Such internal dissonances can influence the political will to maintain a stringent sanction policy. Russia's invasion of Ukraine provoked a *Zeitenwende* in Germany – a turning point that revealed a crisis of foreign policy identity. This crisis, despite internal adaptation difficulties, has led to pivotal shifts in Germany's foreign policy, reinforcing global resilience. Germany has pledged to invest over 2% of GDP in defense, initiated the creation of a special Bundeswehr fund of 100 billion euros, and increased military aid to Ukraine to 8 billion euros in 2024. These steps attest to Germany's strengthened contribution to the overall intensity of international pressure on the aggressor (Bunde, 2025).

France, a key member of the G7 and the EU, is positioned separately with 2711 sanctions. This is attributable to the fact that, in addition to participating in pan-European sanction decisions, France conducts its own national sanction policy. France focuses on freezing the assets of Russian oligarchs, verifying the origin of funds, tightening control over cultural ties, and supporting sanctions in the high-tech, energy, and defense sectors. France's active and decisive stance became particularly evident after the disclosure of the Russian Federation's war crimes and nuclear threats.

Switzerland, traditionally adhering to neutrality, has demonstrated atypical stringency and a strong alignment with the Western political vector, implementing 4029 sanctions. The financial sphere has been identified as a priority area – encompassing account freezes, prohibition of access to Swiss banks, restrictions on capital movement, and control over the assets of sanctioned individuals. Switzerland has also aligned itself with EU sanctions, thereby affirming its support for the Western political vector. Simultaneously, its sanctions are pivotal, as Switzerland serves as a hub for a significant portion of Russian assets.

The United Kingdom, having imposed 2333 sanctions, actively advocates for an independent but highly collaborative sanction policy post-Brexit. Its strategy is predicated not only on the aspiration to block financial flows and combat disinformation but also on a substantial strengthening of support for Ukrainian sovereignty (Miles, 2025). The United Kingdom focuses on blocking financial flows, counteracting the legalization of funds through offshore schemes, sanctioning the defense sector, and combating disinformation. Particular attention has been devoted to Russian influence within British elites, specifically the verification of assets in the real estate and banking systems. The United Kingdom also stands as one of the most active lobbyists for further sanction intensification within international institutions.

Australia, despite its geographical remoteness, consistently supports Western sanction initiatives and has already implemented 1791 sanctions. This exemplifies the truly global scale of the collective response, with its sanction policy directed towards deterring the Russian Federation's military potential, supporting Ukraine as a democratic partner, and demonstrating intolerance for violations of international law. Australia has actively responded to mass war crimes, supporting not only economic restrictions but also diplomatic isolation.

Japan, having imposed 1441 sanctions, acts prudently yet resolutely. Its position is determined by a traditional aspiration to preserve regional stability in Asia, as well as a persistent territorial dispute with the Russian Federation over the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands). Japan's sanctions primarily encompass technological exports, financial restrictions, asset freezes, and travel bans. Furthermore, Japan closely coordinates with its Group of Seven (G7) partners, thereby supporting the global sanction coalition.

Concurrently, it should be noted that Russia has systematically developed its military might and media policy in a coordinated manner, which allows it to shape narratives and influence internal and international perception,

thereby indirectly reducing the effectiveness of sanctions and the willingness of international actors to support or intensify them (Rodgers & Lanoszka, 2023).

Consequently, despite significant sanction activity from Western countries and their allies, many African nations maintain neutrality regarding Russia's war against Ukraine, avoiding both condemnation and support for the Russian Federation's actions. This position, which effectively nullifies the effectiveness of Russia's international isolation, is determined by a number of factors. These include historical ties formed during the Soviet era, as well as Russian narratives that appeal to anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonial sentiments. Economic interests (supply of weapons, grain, energy), military cooperation, and active diplomatic engagement also play a pivotal role, which Russia utilizes to strengthen its *soft power* on the continent and counteract the consequences of Western sanctions (Ogunnoiki et al., 2025).

Overall, the sanction policy against the Russian Federation is characterized by its multi-vector nature, reflecting both the global consensus on countering aggression and the specificities of national interests and political approaches. All countries, regardless of the scale of imposed sanctions, play a significant and collective role in shaping a powerful instrument of international pressure.

4.4. Typology and nature of restrictive measures

No less crucial for a comprehensive analysis of the international sanction regime against Russia is an understanding of the typology and substantive nature of the applied restrictive measures (Fig. 4).




Figure 4. Sanctions dynamics against the Russian Federation in January-August 2025 by types (units), source: constructed based on data from (Castellum.AI, 2025).

The investigation into the segmentation of sanctions by object types demonstrates the systematic and extensive nature of international pressure aimed at deterring the aggressive potential of the Russian Federation. The priority direction of restrictive measures has become the sanctioning of natural persons (individuals), against whom 15,529 restrictions were implemented as of January 20, 2025. However, according to the latest data, as of August 2025, the number of sanctions decreased to 13,611. This vector is determined by the policy of personal responsibility for the escalation and support of military interventions, as well as for participation in human rights violations, the dissemination of propaganda, disinformation, and the financing of terrorist activities. Higher officials, members of parliament, regional officials, propagandists, military commanders, regime-affiliated businessmen, their family members, judges, and special service personnel have been incorporated into the sanction lists. A significant proportion of these sanctions were implemented synchronously by G7 countries, the EU, and other partners, especially after the disclosure of data concerning war crimes in Ukraine.

Sanctions concerning legal entities, totaling 9,061, represent attempts to paralyze economic ties, logistical operations, the production sector, and the financing of military operations. The central elements of these restrictions encompass banks, oil and gas companies, enterprises within the defense-industrial complex, logistics operators, IT sector companies, microelectronics manufacturers, trading intermediaries, pseudo-state entities in occupied territories, and institutions collaborating with Russian special services. A significant factor has been the identification of international supply chains, following which even shell and subsidiary companies in other jurisdictions that provided the Russian Federation with critical technologies or circumvented established restrictions were incorporated into sanction lists. Frequently, sanctions were accompanied by asset freezes and prohibitions on the export and import of dual-use goods.

In the context of global resilience, the sanctions imposed on Russia's economic sectors serve as a direct counter-strategy to aggression. The measures targeting maritime vessels, numbering 1,183, are a deliberate effort to disrupt the logistical chains that underpin Russia's economic and military operations. These restrictions affect not only tankers and cargo vessels but also ships from third countries that assist Russia in circumventing the oil embargo

or engaging in illicit cargo transport from occupied territories. A pivotal element of this strategy is the investigation and disruption of the so-called *shadow fleet*, which facilitates the bypass of the G7 price cap on oil. The implementation of restrictions on insurance, reinsurance, and port access has fundamentally transformed maritime logistics into a point of vulnerability, exposing Russia's reliance on these channels.

The strategic impact of these sanctions is also evident in the air transportation sector. Despite being the smallest category with only 105 restrictions, their effect is disproportionately significant. These sanctions effectively ground aircraft belonging to Russian state entities and business elites, preventing the transport of sanctioned individuals and cargo. Furthermore, the limitations imposed by Western countries on technical maintenance, spare parts, and access to airspace have severely undermined the Russian aviation industry. This strategic pressure has led to a catastrophic degradation of Russia's private and state air transportation capabilities, thereby fragmenting crucial logistical and technical support chains. The repercussions are measurable, with a sharp reduction in airline revenues, reflecting a direct hit to this vital economic sector (Corbet, Nicolau, & Oxley, 2023).

The resilience of the international sanctions regime extends beyond logistics to Russia's broader economic architecture. Supplementary restrictions on financial institutions include freezing assets and limiting access to global financial markets, which encompasses prohibitions on international transactions and bond issuance. In a parallel move to challenge Russia's energy-based resilience, substantial sanctions have been imposed on its energy sector, including an embargo on oil and gas supplies. Additionally, the sanctions extrapolate to technology and innovation, with prohibitions on the export of critical high-tech goods, which impedes Russia's ability to modernize its defense and civilian production (Analitichnyi Tsentri Adastra, 2025). Together, these measures demonstrate a holistic approach to sanctions, a core component of the global strategy to foster resilience and peace in the face of ongoing aggression.

Energy restrictions against Russia have provoked a substantial reduction in foreign exchange earnings—a 10-20% decrease in oil export revenues. US sanctions have significantly impacted Russian oil exports to India and China. In February 2025, export volumes to India decreased by 14.9%. China also adjusted imports due to rising freight costs. Additionally, sanctions in the Arctic have limited oil transportation. Oil exports have declined to a level of less than 3 million barrels per day, and the price of Urals oil demonstrated a fall below 60 dollars per barrel. This has also led to a reduction in GDP by 1% and budget losses of 24 billion dollars, which constitutes 18% of planned revenues for 2025 (DiXi Group, 2025).

Overall, the segmentation of sanctions by object type reflects the global strategy of resilience against aggression, with international pressure on the Russian Federation ranging from targeted impacts on elites to systemic economic blocking. Their comprehensive nature ensures not only a short-term limitation of resources but also a prolonged strategic weakening of the aggressor state. This approach, by promoting a unified front of international accountability, demonstrates the collective commitment to bolstering global resilience against violations of international law.

In the context of the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the sanction regime implemented by the international community concerning the Russian Federation is positioned as a key instrument of international pressure. However, the empirical efficacy of these measures demonstrates ambivalence, largely determined by the resilience and adaptive capacity of the Russian economy to external shocks. Research, notably by Orla O. V., Yatskivska A. V., and Vlasenko O. O. (2023), emphasizes that sanctions have not caused the anticipated destructive economic effect, as evidenced by the persistent growth of Russia's GDP under restrictive measures. Concurrently, the effectiveness of sanctions has been undeniably verified in the geopolitical context, which manifests in the intensification of Russia's international isolation and systematic limitations on its access to critical technologies and international financing.

A primary challenge to the efficacy of the sanction policy has proven to be the internal political dynamics within the European Union, which directly impacts the collective capacity for global resilience against aggression. The rise of Euroscepticism and populist rhetoric in member states provokes blockages or prolonged delays in the adoption of key sanction decisions, nullifying the promptness and overall effectiveness of sanction responses to the Russian Federation's aggression (Yavir, 2024). The heterogeneity of support for Ukraine in Europe correlates with the level of populist narratives and Euroscepticism among political parties. Empirical analysis, based on a survey of parties in 29 countries, identified that 97 out of 269 parties do not approve of the full spectrum of countermeasures against aggression, including the acceptance of increasing energy costs, which directly impacts the coherence of sanction policy and its economic effectiveness (Hooghe et al., 2024). Moreover, the efficacy of this policy depends on the administrative capacity of member states to implement restrictive measures taking into account national specificities, which often complicates their stringent and effective application (Karliuga, 2024).

The phenomenon of the proliferation of *shadow vessels*, which transport Russian oil, creates an exogenous challenge to the full efficacy of international sanctions. Although in 2025 the share of *shadow* tankers in the maritime export of crude oil from the Russian Federation demonstrated a reduction from 65% to 46% (Centre for research on energy and clean air, 2025), their absolute number increased exponentially: from approximately 200 vessels in 2022 to 600 in 2023 and 1000 in 2024 (Atlantic Council, 2025). This indicates that, despite a decrease in relative share, *shadow* tankers continue to provide a substantial volume of transport, especially for actors who have not

joined the sanction regime. Consequently, international sanctions against vessels and their owners have proven largely ineffective due to the adaptability of the shadow fleet and practices of evasion from inspections, which represents an anomaly in the context of their stated objective.

The absence of a unified position among the G7 states (Government of Canada, 2025) compromises the collective efficacy of the sanction regime. This creates a strategic advantage for the Russian Federation on the international stage, allowing it to more easily locate and secure new markets (Gasparyan, 2025), which, in turn, diminishes the overall impact of sanction pressure. Karpinska N. V. (2025) emphasizes the imperative for the continual modernization of sanction policy, specifically through the optimization of monitoring mechanisms and the enhancement of counter-evasion schemes. The ultimate effectiveness of the sanction regime is fundamentally determined by the level of international coordination and the capacity for the allocation of financial resources to intensify pressure. A comparative analysis of sanction policy against Russia with other precedents confirms that the efficacy of sanctions is predicated upon a holistic approach, which incorporates economic, diplomatic, and military measures. A pivotal aspect is the synchronization of sanction measures among all states participating in sanction coalitions. Although sectoral restrictions have significantly complicated the functioning of the Russian economy, their implementation mechanisms must be continually improved to achieve maximal effectiveness. A key factor is the intensification of international collaboration and the integration of new restrictive measures, which minimizes opportunities for sanction circumvention. In light of these challenges, the effectiveness of sanction policy requires ongoing optimization through the strengthening of control mechanisms and internal coordination among member states of sanction coalitions. Only a comprehensive approach, which integrates sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and military measures, is capable of ensuring the realization of strategic objectives, including the cessation of Russian aggression and the promotion of regional stability.

5. Conclusions

The intensity of the international community's sanction policy against the Russian Federation has increased exponentially, manifesting an unprecedented systemic approach to economic pressure that challenges global security. The implemented restrictions encompass a diversified spectrum of economic sectors, from finance and energy to technology and transport. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the cumulative growth in the number of sanctions underscored global solidarity in response to fundamental violations of international security and international law. This aggression, which has caused an anticipated 1.4% reduction in global GDP, directly undermines the principles of sustainable development by violating SDGs, which are oriented toward fostering peaceful societies, economic growth, and global partnerships.

The protracted geopolitical aggression functions as a critical multiplier of systemic risks, fundamentally undermining the foundations of sustainable development. Specifically, the escalating economic destabilization inevitably intensifies global poverty, food instability, and economic inequality, which is a direct factor in the regression toward achieving key GDGs. The protracted nature of the military confrontation is demonstrably correlated with the regression of world economic stability, which directly undermines progress toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Nevertheless, despite the scaled pressure, the sanctions' efficacy has proven partially limited due to the pronounced resilience of the Russian economy and its capacity for adaptation, including the diversification of export markets, particularly in the energy sector.

The effectiveness of the sanction regime is largely determined by the intensification of coordination among initiating countries and the operational capacity to adapt sanction packages to evolving geopolitical conditions. A key imperative is countering circumvention schemes, which includes countermeasures against the *shadow fleet* and restricting Russia's access to critical and dual-use technologies. The permanent modernization of sanction policy is a necessary attribute for maximizing pressure on the aggressor state's economy.

Prospects for future research should focus on a holistic assessment of the prolonged economic impact of sanctions on relevant sectors of the Russian economy that directly determine its potential for waging a protracted war. Research is also pertinent for optimizing control mechanisms for intermediaries used for sanction circumvention and intensifying international coordination to minimize such practices. From the perspective of ensuring international security, it is critically important to implement more stringent restrictions on the export of Russian energy resources and to further lower their price cap. The permanent improvement of international cooperation mechanisms and the synchronization of sanctions are prerequisites for the consolidation of global security and an effective response to evolving geopolitical challenges.

Overall, while the intensity of the international community's sanction policy against Russia has become a vital instrument of economic pressure, it demands systemic optimization and continuous adaptation to achieve maximal efficacy against a resilient aggressor. Only through an integrated policy and enhanced collaboration is the international community capable of achieving its strategic objectives in ensuring global security and stability.

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