Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

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DOI

Zhaopeng Chu

kingzhaopeng@gmail.com

Chen Bian

jun.yang@acadiau.ca

Jun Yang

jun.yang@acadiau.ca

Abstract

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.

Keywords:

air pollution, environmental regulation, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

References

Article Details

Chu, Z., Bian, C., & Yang, J. (2022). Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game. Problemy Ekorozwoju, 17(1), 222–233. https://doi.org/10.35784/pe.2022.1.20

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