Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

Zhaopeng Chu


School of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, 195 Chuangxin Road,Hunnan District, Shenyang 110819, China (China)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9284-1602

Chen Bian


School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China (China)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672

Jun Yang

jun.yang@acadiau.ca
F.C. Manning School of Business Administration, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, B4P 2R6, Canada (Canada)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672

Abstract

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.


Keywords:

air pollution, environmental regulation, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

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Published
2022-01-03

Cited by

Chu, Z., Bian, C., & Yang, J. (2022). Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game. Problemy Ekorozwoju, 17(1), 222–233. https://doi.org/10.35784/pe.2022.1.20

Authors

Zhaopeng Chu 

School of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, 195 Chuangxin Road,Hunnan District, Shenyang 110819, China China
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9284-1602

Authors

Chen Bian 

School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China China
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672

Authors

Jun Yang 
jun.yang@acadiau.ca
F.C. Manning School of Business Administration, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, B4P 2R6, Canada Canada
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672

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