Przepisy dotyczące zanieczyszczenia powietrza w Chinach: podejście do symulacji polityki i gry ewolucyjnej
Zhaopeng Chu
School of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, 195 Chuangxin Road,Hunnan District, Shenyang 110819, China (Chiny)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9284-1602
Chen Bian
School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China (Chiny)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672
Jun Yang
jun.yang@acadiau.caF.C. Manning School of Business Administration, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, B4P 2R6, Canada (Kanada)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672
Abstrakt
W kontekście instytucjonalnym chińskiej centralizacji politycznej i decentralizacji fiskalnej, niniejsze badanie analizuje regulacje środowiskowe, które zmuszają rządy centralne i lokalne do wspólnych wysiłków na rzecz kontroli zanieczyszczenia powietrza. Symulacje polityki w grze ewolucyjnej pokazują, że najlepszym podejściem jest internalizacja kosztów i korzyści środowiskowych w funkcji celu samorządu. Skuteczność kilku instrumentów polityki jest badana indywidualnie i wspólnie, w tym kontroli administracyjnej, płatności transferowych i podatków ekologicznych. Wykazano, że w przypadku braku internalizacji konsekwencji środowiskowych, odpowiednie zastosowanie instrumentów polityki może zmotywować zorientowane na cel samorządy lokalne do wyboru społecznie optymalnej strategii.
Słowa kluczowe:
zanieczyszczenie powietrza, degradacja środowiska, gra ewolucyjna, symulacja numerycznaBibliografia
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Autorzy
Zhaopeng ChuSchool of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, 195 Chuangxin Road,Hunnan District, Shenyang 110819, China Chiny
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9284-1602
Autorzy
Chen BianSchool of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China Chiny
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672
Autorzy
Jun Yangjun.yang@acadiau.ca
F.C. Manning School of Business Administration, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, B4P 2R6, Canada Kanada
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672
Statystyki
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Licencja
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