Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

W kontekście instytucjonalnym chińskiej centralizacji politycznej i decentralizacji fiskalnej, niniejsze badanie analizuje regulacje środowiskowe, które zmuszają rządy centralne i lokalne do wspólnych wysiłków na rzecz kontroli zanieczyszczenia powietrza. Symulacje polityki w grze ewolucyjnej pokazują, że najlepszym podejściem jest internalizacja kosztów i korzyści środowiskowych w funkcji celu samorządu. Skuteczność kilku instrumentów polityki jest badana indywidualnie i wspólnie, w tym kontroli administracyjnej, płatności transferowych i podatków ekologicznych. Wykazano, że w przypadku braku internalizacji konsekwencji środowiskowych, odpowiednie zastosowanie instrumentów polityki może zmotywować zorientowane na cel samorządy lokalne do wyboru społecznie optymalnej strategii.

Słowa kluczowe:

zanieczyszczenie powietrza, degradacja środowiska, gra ewolucyjna, symulacja numeryczna

Bibliografia

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Numer Tom 17 Nr 1 (2022)

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